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The Shape of Things

THE UNANNOUNCED ARRIVAL OF PRIME Minister Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook in Washington gave sudden and dramatic meaning to the words "grand strategy," which, though on every lip, have sounded a bit hollow during the dark days since December 7. Before that, even though the United States was certainly "in the war," our role was that of contributor rather than full participant. We backed up but did not share the efforts of the belligerent nations. Now we must, abruptly and fast, merge our men and resources and plans in a struggle so nearly universal that one mind, or even one policy board, can hardly encompass it. We must take our place—and obviously it will be a leading one—on the over-all world-strategy board which must emerge from the dramatic conference in Washington. Out of this meeting, too, must come proposals for regional military commands, for economic-planning and political-policy boards. The new problems created by the Far Eastern war and by our own participation demand instant action of a scope and boldness never before achieved among the enemies of Hitlerism. All over the world, in Germany and the conquered countries as well as in the fighting democracies, those enemies will rejoice at the evidence of initiative and determination provided by Mr. Churchill's gallant flight to Washington.

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THE LARGE-SCALE JAPANESE LANDING ON the shores of the Lingayen Gulf some 150 miles north of Manila is, in one sense, a surprising move. It commits the Japanese to a major operation in the Philippines after they had already become heavily engaged in Malaya. Yet Singapore must be their chief objective, for it is the key to the East Indies, the Burma road, and the main line of Anglo-American communications. Its loss would long delay the maturing of a counter-offensive against Japan and would leave the Philippines isolated, greatly assisting their conquest. The heavy attack on Luzon must mean, therefore, that the Japanese regard the American forces there as so dangerous a threat to their command of the South China Sea that they must be disposed of

before an all-out effort to capture Singapore is undertaken. General MacArthur appears to have had a very shrewd idea of where the major blow against Manila was to be expected and has not been induced to scatter his limited forces by widespread feint attacks. The British command in Malaya, which has been under fire because of its seemingly feeble defense of the northern border, has probably been moved by similar considerations. The new line that it has now established in Perak will ease its communication problems, assist the containing of any new landings on the east coast, and make available support by fighter planes from the air bases in the vicinity of Singapore.

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BY OCCUPYING TIMOR THE BRITISH AND Dutch have indicated that they do not intend to be caught napping yet again by a strict observance of neutral rights. When one side in a war flagrantly and repeatedly disregards international law, the other is finally compelled to follow suit in self-defense. In the case of Timor, the eastern half of which is a Portuguese possession, the British had proposed to Lisbon some weeks ago that measures be taken for its joint defense. The Portuguese government had expressed willingness to receive British and Dutch aid but only after aggression had occurred. Since the colony's defenses are negligible, this would clearly have been too late. Moreover, the Japanese had recently obtained a concession to establish an air line between Timor and their base in the Palau Islands. There was no conceivable commercial justification for such a line, but despite British and Dutch protests it was granted. When, therefore, Japanese submarines were observed in the neighborhood of the island, the Anglo-Dutch authorities decided to act. The strategic position of Timor is such that the risk of Japanese occupation had to be averted at any cost. As a submarine base it would have endangered shipping routes throughout the East Indies, and it is within bombing range of the Australian naval station at Port Darwin and the great Dutch base at Soerabaja. The Lisbon government has protested but has not taken any other action. However, it is under pressure from the Axis, which at any time now may decide that Portugal must be "protected." One breach having been made in Portuguese neutrality, it would be a wise move for the British and Americans to go the whole hog and assume control of the even more vital Atlantic islands—the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and the Madeiras. We cannot afford to let the Nazis reach these outposts first.

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THERE ARE A GOOD MANY SIGNS OF AN early German putsch in the direction of North Africa, provided Hitler is able to extricate enough men from the Russian snows. This would mean the entry of Spain into the war on the side of the Axis, the occupation of Portugal, and demands on Marshal Pétain to waive the colonial clause of the armistice agreement—or else. Nor is it easy to see how Hitler could get control of the Mediterranean and the all-important northwest corner of Africa, including Dakar, without the use of the French fleet. Apparently our relations with Vichy take little account of these probabilities. The State Department continues to act on the assumption that we would antagonize the French people and drive them into the Axis camp if we took any strong action against French possessions. But this assumption is based on the premise that Vichy and the French people are one and the same thing, which is ridiculous. The more pressure we put on the unrepresentative Pétain government the more encouragement we give to the real France; the more we appease Vichy the more we enhance its prestige and aid its efforts to bring France into the New Order. A few days ago Washington announced proudly that an agreement had been reached with the Governor of Martinique—a notorious pro-fascist—for the preservation of the neutral attitude of the French possessions and fleet in this hemisphere. There is no suggestion that any guaranties have been asked for, nor is the State Department apparently perturbed by the fact that Vichy has denied knowledge of the agreement and could therefore refuse to honor it. Considering the strategic position of Martinique in relation to the Canal Zone and our Caribbean bases, this matter seems to have been handled in a fatally optimistic fashion.

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OUR DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS FOR VITAL raw materials is now being painfully brought home to us. For the time being we cannot count on receiving any shipments of rubber and tin from the Far East, from which we have hitherto received the bulk of our supplies. And even after the shipping situation has improved we may continue to experience scarcity of these commodities, for the ravages of war in Malaya will cut down output for a long time to come. With the evacuation of Penang the British lost one of their two big Eastern tin smelters, and they are now fighting the Japanese in an area containing many important rubber plantations and tin mines. A scorched-earth policy to prevent use of these by the enemy is threatened, and if this becomes necessary on a large scale, rubber at least will be in short supply for years. We are beginning to build up a synthetic-rubber industry, but its costs of production are high and its capacity small in comparison with rubber consumption. Latin American output of both plantation and wild rubber can be increased somewhat, but even after two years it could hardly amount to more than about one-sixth of our normal requirements. Fortunately, we have fairly large stocks of both rubber and tin in the country—amounting to about one year's supply of each.

With economy these stocks can probably be made to last two years, but this will involve discontinuing certain forms of manufacture and the strict rationing of such articles as tires. The sale of new tires has been suspended until January 7, presumably to enable a rationing scheme to be organized. Many millions of car owners are likely to find themselves entirely excluded from purchasing tires, but some special provision will have to be made for defense workers. If they cannot be provided with houses near their jobs, they must be given means of transport.

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CHICKENS HATCHED A YEAR AGO WHEN the automobile business decided to go all-out for business as usual rather than speed up the conversion of its plants to defense production were coming home to roost in Detroit this week. The shortage of rubber has forced a curtailment in output beyond the cuts previously decreed by OPM, and the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission sees as a result 206,000 workers idle within the next seven days. The United Automobile Workers fears that this figure will be increased to 350,000 by February 1. If men in these numbers remain jobless for more than a few weeks, the time they are compelled to waste will dwarf that much-publicized figure of man-days lost through strikes. In view of the great demand for skilled machine men in other parts of the country, many of the auto workers are likely to scatter unless new jobs are quickly forthcoming in Michigan. Then when the new defense plants there do open, it will be difficult to man them. Now that civilian production is definitely out, however, we shall not be surprised to learn that, after all, the automobile industry can convert its tools to defense production. A "ranking industrialist" is quoted in the December 22 issue of *Barron's*, the financial weekly, as saying that 80 per cent of the tools in the industry can be used for needed defense purposes and that most of them will be "in action" in from three to eight weeks. So perhaps Walter Reuther and his plan are about to be vindicated.

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THE NEED FOR A COMPLETE CHANGE IN THE present personnel and methods of the defense program is ably argued and graphically illustrated in the special report made by the Tolan committee, "Recommendations on Full Utilization of America's Industrial Capacity and Labor Supply in the War Effort." The committee urges the setting up of a central board which would in effect constitute a civilian Ministry of Supply, empowered to take control of procurement from army and navy officials. It calls for an inventory of the production facilities of every industry, their pooling and conversion for defense purposes, and the widest possible spread of orders. It suggests that plane, tank, and other armament assemblies be broken down into as small "bits and pieces" as possible to permit scattered facilities to be brought into the defense program. The report, which was widely circulated among Administration officials before its release, is believed to represent the views of those who advocate the merging of both OPM and SPAB in a new over-all defense agency. The rejection of the Victory Program by Knudsen and army-navy procurement officials, despite all the ballyhoo given that program in October, is said to have put New Dealers and the White House in a mood for a drastic reorganization of the defense setup. We hope that this is so.

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WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT PRESS IN ON a country suddenly at war, the House of Representatives has found time to pass a silly and utterly useless bill for controlling the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, and the Kyffheuser Bund. The measure calls for the registration of these organizations as direct agents of foreign governments and the surrender of their membership lists for the public record. Here is one more lazy attempt to substitute legislative buckshot aimed at specific groups or individuals for a reasoned law resting on a broad base of public policy. Suppose the Senate should prove thoughtless enough to go along on this bill and imagine for a moment that the President would sign it. What would happen then? It is our guess that before his signature was dry the Communist Party, U. S. A., the German-American Bund, and the Kyffheuser Bund would have formally passed out of existence, and that within the succeeding twenty-four hours something like a League of American Workers with Hand and Brain, a German-American Kulturverein, and a Dingelhoofer Bund would come into being. Then Congress would have to start all over again, and after a while it would have no time left for the war. Compulsory publicity concerning the source of funds of *all* organizations engaged in propaganda activities seems to us a more intelligent and effective approach. If the late America First Committee had been forced to disclose the identity of its angels, we suspect it would have decomposed long before Japanese bombs blew it to bits.

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THE SPEED WITH WHICH CONGRESS PASSED the bill extending the draft age for military service to cover all men between twenty and forty-four, inclusive, contrasts sharply with the delay encountered by the original Burke-Wadsworth conscription bill less than a year and a half ago. The only opposition to the Administration program for extending the draft arose in connection with the army's desire to conscript youths under twenty-one. The House balked at this request and voted to retain twenty-one as the lower limit of the draft. But

after the Senate had acceded to the Administration's request and set the limit at nineteen, the conferees compromised on twenty. While there is a certain justice in the argument that a man should not be called upon to fight for his country before he is permitted to vote, we believe that it is unfortunate that the draft age was not lowered to nineteen, or even eighteen. It is generally agreed that young men in their upper teens make much better soldiers than men in their thirties or forties. Young men have shown themselves particularly skilful in aviation and mechanized warfare. Moreover, men of this age are least likely to be engaged in essential civilian activities or to be encumbered by family responsibility. In peace time it might be argued that it is wise to permit these young men to complete their education before starting their military service, but in time of war it becomes a choice between men not yet established in productive life and men at the peak of their productive powers. We believe that in view of the army's experience with draftees in the twenty-eight to thirty-five age group, its recommendations should have been given more weight.

Partners in Guilt

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

LAST week the President and the War and Navy departments showed that they could act boldly and move fast. The appointment of a Board of Inquiry headed by Supreme Court Justice Roberts and the displacement of the army, navy, and army air force commanders in Hawaii followed immediately upon Secretary Knox's round-trip flight to the island and his report that the sea and air forces were not on the alert when the Japanese attacked.

The government's drastic action is reassuring. Americans can stand bad news; the disaster at Pearl Harbor itself—revealing so nakedly the purposes and gangster tactics of the Japanese—aroused rather than depressed the spirit of the people. But the mood of belligerent defiance would have quickly simmered down into suspicion if the disaster had been minimized or hushed up and the persons responsible for it whitewashed.

A shake-up never has a bad effect if it carries with it the promise of reform. It was not until new men took hold of Britain's war effort after the defeat in Norway and the heroic catastrophe at Dunkirk that the people of the British Isles shook off the apathy that had dominated the Chamberlain period of the war with Germany. If our lesser Dunkirk can be made the means of injecting a new sense of the fierce initiative and implacable determination that characterize Axis strategy, it will have been worth even the 3,000 lives sacrificed on the altar of American complacency.

But the President's quick action at Hawaii serves to dramatize the need of similar action closer home. Political policies offer no excuse for military dereliction; the commanding officers in Hawaii who were responsible for the island's state of unreadiness deserve the full consequences of their failure. But it is fair to say that the political relations of the United States with Japan provided no hint that an attack was possible. The President himself has emphasized the incredible duplicity practiced by Japan's responsible officials, from the envoys in Washington to the Mikado in Tokyo. It is clear that the American negotiators—with a complacency merely mirrored in the negligence at Hawaii—thought that Japan would avoid war as long as it had any hope of gaining even small concessions by diplomatic means. This was the official belief, freely transmitted to the country. Is it not fair to assume that this belief was communicated directly or by implication to the American naval and military authorities in the Pacific and Far East? And if this is so, is it not fair also to insist on a division of the responsibility for the disaster?

The men in the State Department who engineered the policy of appeasement, which for the past four years has assured both Japan and the United States that this country would permit one aggression after another rather than risk trouble, are full partners in the guilt of Pearl Harbor. They should be retired along with the responsible admirals and generals. An inquiry should not be necessary: their record is plainly written in the history of these last disastrous years.

Such action is too much to hope for. Our Dunkirk was not final and sweeping enough to blast out government offices as well as military commands. The President has not yet convinced himself that the Munich mind operates with fatal effect in the Department of State just as it did in the Foreign Office. He still reposes confidence in men who have lost the confidence of the public. And so we shall no doubt continue to make deals with pro-Nazi Frenchmen and send oil to fascist Spaniards till new Pearl Harbors drive home the lesson so bitterly learned abroad. And democratic Europeans will continue to be shunned as potential trouble-makers while members of the frayed nobility and landowning gentry of Central Europe get official pats on the back. And Latin Americans who try to tell our officials such facts as are set forth in the Warning from South America in this issue of *The Nation* will continue to meet with polite skepticism or out-and-out disapproval.

During the last few days the situation in the Argentine, which I mentioned last week, has become more threatening and more sharply defined. Dr. Castillo, Acting President, has gathered all power into his own hands, first by decreeing a state of siege and dismissing Parliament, and then by replacing three pro-Ally ministers

with men sure to support him and his policy of strict—meaning pro-Axis—neutrality. His pretense that the emergency was declared in order that he might more effectively suppress Axis propaganda and carry out his obligations under the Panama and Havana pacts was short-lived. His first act was the suppression of a great national demonstration planned in honor of President Roosevelt. He has followed this by returning his ambassador to Rome—indicating an unshaken determination to maintain relations with the Axis countries—and by prohibiting the press from publishing anything which might "disturb the friendly relations of the Argentine nation with other countries." Even the New York *Times* correspondent, Arnaldo Cortesi, who has appeared in the past to accept without question the official version of Castillo's maneuvers, remarked that this latest move "is all to the advantage of the Axis powers," since the Argentine press with few exceptions "favors the democratic cause."

It would be naive to assume that the State Department is ignorant of the meaning of the Argentine crisis. On the contrary, no man knows better than Sumner Welles what is going on in the Latin countries. But the United States has a long record of "successful" dealings with dictators; in Latin America as elsewhere it applies a nice mixture of appeasement and economic pressure. And usually, in normal times, the method works—well enough, at least, to satisfy the interests of American business men if not of the people of the countries in question. But sometimes it doesn't work. It doesn't work when it runs head-on into the far subtler and far more powerful methods applied in the interests of Axis diplomacy. It didn't work in Japan. It isn't working in Spain or Vichy. And it won't work with the pro-Axis dictatorships in Latin America unless an Allied victory pitches them willy-nilly, into the arms of their Good Neighbor. But if that happens a lot of soft soap and dollars will have been wasted.

The Russian Victories

THE Nazi military record in this war is such that most people, including ourselves, have tended to feel that the news which has come out of Russia during the past few weeks was too good to be true. But Hitler's removal of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the German army and his replacement by Hitler himself indicates that the Nazi military situation in Russia is more serious than we had dared to hope. Hitler clearly showed his concern over the eastern front when he appealed to his soldiers "to hold and defend until spring" the gains already made against "the most dangerous enemy of all time." He had told the German people a day or so earlier that the Reich was fighting a foe "superior in numbers and material," and Goebbels had called upon the impoverished civilian population to contribute blankets, heavy coats, shoes, and gloves for the army, caught by the Russian winter "which has arrived so early this year." The military commentator in Hitler's own paper has gone so far as to admit that man for man the Russian soldiers "equal us and are sometimes even better," and to confess that Germany seriously underestimated Russia's economic and industrial resources. Even the German people, well-trained as they are in accepting Nazi contradictions, may find it difficult to reconcile these admissions of German weakness and Russian strength with Hitler's boasts in October that the Russian armies had been annihilated and that further organized resistance was impossible.

The statements of Hitler and his aides, as we have learned from bitter experience, should never be taken at their face value. In this case, as in others, they were made with the full knowledge that they would be played up by the democracies, and on previous occasions Hitler has been known to encourage the spread of stories of Nazi difficulty and dissension just before launching a new attack. It is quite probable also that the statements were designed to drive home the Nazi contention that the choice before the German people is victory or extermination. Hitler's action in ousting his top general is a trick in one sense. Von Brauchitsch has always bowed to Hitler's leadership, and if Hitler, as he says, took supreme command in 1938, he could hardly do it again in 1941. The real significance of this move lies in the fact that Hitler has obviously found it necessary to disavow responsibility for the Russian campaign and has taken the immemorial way of doing it—by selecting a scapegoat.

The dismissal of von Brauchitsch, in other words, confirms the essential fact that German arms have suffered a reverse in Russia. And that is important. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate the Russian successes up to date. Soviet communiqués have spoken of "exterminating" the enemy. But a careful reading of the dispatches will reveal that the Germans are not only far from being "exterminated" but have actually not been driven back any great distance so far. The threat to Moscow and Leningrad has undoubtedly been lifted, and it seems unlikely that the Germans can make another effort to seize these cities before spring. But the Nazis have apparently been able to retreat in good order—although strongly harried by the Red Army—and are still within easy striking distance of Russia's two greatest cities. According to the most recent reports, the Germans are still in the vicinity of Mozhaisk—sixty miles west of Moscow—and are still astride the Moscow-Leningrad railway south of the great Baltic seaport. In general, the Russians have recovered only about half the territory they lost during November. If they can keep the Nazis

on the run and prevent them from digging in on their chosen line, then it will be time enough to talk of rout. And we must bear in mind that as the Red Army advances over twice-devastated territory, its own communications problem will grow harder.

The Case of Copper

COPPER is one of the basic necessities of modern war. Shell casings are made of brass, and brass is 70 per cent copper. One type of bomber requires more than two miles of copper wire alone to keep it flying. Every time a battleship slides down the ways another two million pounds of copper have gone to sea. In copper, as in aluminum, the OPM was slow to recognize danger, slower to admit shortages. These are now upon us. On September 20 the OPM admitted that there would be a shortage of 230,000 short tons this year, of 770,000 short tons next year. Even these figures overestimated supply, underestimated demand. On October 21 an order was issued forbidding all use of copper in building construction after November 1, and use of copper in a long list of civilian commodities was reduced 30 to 40 per cent below last year. On November 14 the OPM admitted that "with a demand for more than 150,000 tons of copper for direct military and lend-lease use during the current month, only an estimated 128,197 tons of this critical metal is available." The September estimates had pictured copper supply as adequate to fill direct military and lend-lease requirements but insufficient to cover all civilian needs.

While the need for copper has been rising, production has been falling. This extraordinary discovery the country owes to the Senate's Truman committee and to the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers' Union. Copper, lead, and zinc are extracted in the same mining processes. All three are vital war materials. The production of all three has been lagging. The output of lead this year will be the smallest since 1926. The production of zinc—shell casings are 30 per cent zinc—is slightly higher than last year but not yet up to the level of 1926-29. Copper production this year, with a total estimated demand of close to 2,000,000 tons, was up only 15,000 tons over last year. Even this increase is deceptive, for it is accounted for by the production record of one company alone. Kennecott Copper increased its output by more than 55,000 tons this year. This means that total production of all other companies was actually 40,000 tons below last year. Behind this poor production record lie the backward methods of the industry, a tacit slow-down by capital to force an increase in the price of copper, and a silent protest against the excess-profits tax. Industry representatives complained before the committee that the excess-profits tax made it more profitable for the companies to curtail production now and mine more ore later when the tax would be lower.

While capital holds back, labor is in a position to take the lead. The Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers' Union, through Philip Murray of the C. I. O., has presented a plan to expand copper production. It wants an industry-wide inventory to determine what happened to the many copper, lead, and zinc mines which have closed down since 1929. There were 180 copper mines operating in that year; only 49 were producing ten years later. It wants to know just how many mines are operating at less than full capacity, and has provided the Truman committee with some startling examples of lackadaisical operation in a period of crisis. Anaconda, at its rich mine at Butte, Montana, is now producing 2,000 tons a month less than in the first half of the year. In one of the world's largest mining camps half the miners are working less than half the month. The union wants improved safety and ventilation devices and explained the relationship between these and output. It revealed the backwardness of production methods in an industry where profits per man have run so high as to make it unnecessary in the past to adopt modern division-of-labor techniques. It pointed to the bad planning which has failed to gear expansion of the brass industry to the supply of copper; so that although brass-mill capacity is being enlarged 79 per cent, 40 per cent of the existing plant cannot obtain metal to continue operation.

The detailed suggestions and constructive criticism in the union's twenty-seven-page memorandum to the President and the testimony of its research director, Ben Riskin, contrast sharply with the testimony of the dollar-a-year men examined by the Truman committee. The contrast is the best argument for the union's proposal that a labor-management council be set up in the industry to run a "Production for Victory" program. The principal dollar-a-year witness, Philip D. Reed, deputy director of the OPM's Materials Division, showed an ignorance of the basic facts and figures inexcusable in one who in private life is chairman of the board of General Electric. The other dollar-a-year man earns his living as consultant to the great copper companies which must be criticized if output is to be lifted. It is easy to understand his reluctance to treat clients roughly. The SPAB, in an effort to take the heat off the OPM, announced hearings on ways to expand copper output, but has since declared that it would take written suggestions instead of holding public hearings. New ideas will go into the OPM's wastebaskets unless labor is given a seat in its copper councils and a voice in its decisions on copper. We suggest that the Truman committee complete the picture by putting Jesse Jones on the stand and showing the relationship between the high prices paid the big American copper companies for their low-cost Chilean ore and their unwillingness to expand production in this country.

The Shake-up We Need

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, December 21

I AM reliably informed that recent events abroad have led our War College to the reluctant conclusion that the cavalry charge is no longer likely to be decisive. It is at least as important to overhaul our social as our military thinking. No official here will admit it in public, and few in private, but what this country needs is more interference with private enterprise. The military-naval revolution which has enabled a coalition of smaller, poorer, and hungrier powers to attack the British, French, Dutch, and American empires with such success is also the reflection of a social revolution, and requires the reexamination of the bromides which ordinarily pass among us for profound truths. When wars are fought with tanks and planes, defeat or victory is decided on the assembly line. We see the relationship between technology and military power, but we have only begun to recognize that technology is more than the fabrication of new weapons. It also includes the way in which we organize our society to produce those weapons, for on that organization may depend the volume of our output, the speed of our production.

In all the talk here of impending shake-ups in defense, too little is heard of the need for a shake-up in fundamental ideas. Without it the effect of substituting Willkie for Knudsen or Wallace for Jesse Jones is likely to be less than miraculous. The war now unfolding marks the end of laissez faire, long honored more in the speech than in the observance, and the fate of free government depends on riding this tide, not bucking it. The root of our troubles, the basic defect of our war effort, the reason for our idle facilities lie in a system of ideas which leads us to regard the proposal to draft machines with horror while we look on the draft of men with equanimity. This is but the war-time reflection of the double standard which normally determines our attitude toward the rights of property on the one hand and the rights of human beings on the other. A society which regards it as proper in an economic crisis to throw men out of work at once but shameful to default on a bond until absolutely necessary is handicapped by its *mores* in mobilizing itself for war. The people who live in it are willing to order a man to risk his life for his country but reluctant to tell a factory owner that he must turn out parts for tanks—or else. Yet in a modern war we can no more depend on the profit motive to gear our economy for an all-out effort than we can depend on the profit motive to fill our army with enlistments at $21 a month and board. Until this is recognized, said publicly, and acted upon, we are headed for one unpleasant military surprise after another.

Just one year ago, in *The Nation* of December 21, 1940, I broke the story of the Reuther plan. Today's papers carry the news that 206,000 workers in Michigan will lose their jobs in the next seven days because no steps have yet been taken to convert automobile factories to defense production. This inability of a great and rich country to gather up sufficient will to mobilize its full energies for war is characteristic of empires in their senility. We are again the victim of want amid plenty, though this time it is a want of armament amid plenty of potential productive capacity. Solution of the problem has been hampered by a succession of complacencies in the capital. The first was the easy assumption that we were unbeatable because we had the greatest productive system in the world. When it began to be realized that this productive system was being largely devoted to a boom in consumer goods, it was assumed that it would transform itself automatically into a vast arsenal if we curtailed the output of automobiles, washing machines, refrigerators, and new houses.

A few months ago, however, officials and others began to see that curtailment alone was no guaranty that facilities made idle by scarcity of materials would be converted to defense production. Smaller industries found it hard to obtain orders from the big business men running the OPM and hard to interest the conventionally thinking army-navy procurement officers in the possibility of turning out armament in factories normally used to produce washing machines. Now I find officials assuming that "December 7 changed all that." The attack on Pearl Harbor should have ended "business as usual," but it did not. To assume that it will without any action on our part is a curious, and comfortable, kind of fatalism. It is well to remember that bombs have been falling on the capital of the British Empire for two years without completely ending business as usual.

The truth is that while men like Stimson and Knox helped the President on the war issue by getting out in front, the top liberals and labor men in the defense setup have been more anxious to avoid fights than to exercise leadership. A fight is now brewing behind the scenes over the scuttling of the Victory Program by Knudsen and army-navy procurement, but at the SPAB meeting at which the program was cut down by some 2› per cent neither Donald Nelson nor Leon Henderson nor

Sidney Hillman put up an effective battle. All three have been good influences, but none of them is a fighter. Henderson is more smoke than fire. Nelson shines most by contrast with his fellow-business men. Hillman is able but not inspired or inspiring, and I was glad to see the Tolan committee take a rap at him in its excellent report on the measures needed to mobilize all our productive facilities for war. If Hillman had had the courage to go on the air last fall in support of the Reuther plan he would have looked a hero today. Unfortunately his is not the kind of leadership that will help us find our way to total effort for total war.

It is easy for a newspaperman writing for an independent weekly to talk of the need for interfering with private enterprise. It is hard for these men and other political leaders to do or say anything about it. Our government has political sovereignty under democratic processes, but in the sphere of our economy it is still in the position of a sovereign in feudal times and must deal with powerful economic overlords whose control over the means of public discussion make them formidable antagonists. Public officials who run afoul of these great interests take their careers in their hands, and few can be found to venture a head-on collision with them. Agencies like the Dies committee and the FBI play a valuable role here in keeping the progressives frightened and worried and thus in curbing the most useful forces in the war effort. In this connection I would like to point to Secretary Knox's statement that the most powerful fifth column since Norway operated in Hawaii and to ask why the FBI, with all the vast sums and great power at its disposal, seems to have been so ineffective in curbing it. Maybe if it spent less time tapping wires in an effort to get Harry Bridges and scaring minor clerks in government offices by asking them what they think of communism and what their religious affiliations are, it would have more time left for the kind of detective operations we needed on Oahu.

The Outlook in the Pacific

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

December 20

PERHAPS the greatest embarrassment of military riches in modern history faced the Japanese High Command after its successes over the American navy at Pearl Harbor and the British Far Eastern fleet near Singapore. The Philippine Islands, Hongkong, Malaya, Singapore, the Burma road, commercial war on Britain by Japanese raiders in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific, the cutting of American lines of communication with the Philippines to deprive the islands of reinforcements and American industry of tin and rubber, the oil wells of Burma and Borneo—all must have beckoned enticingly to the exultant Japanese.

In considering this wealth of opportunities, however, the Japanese were confronted with several obstacles to easy success. With probably fifty of the sixty to seventy divisions of its armies tied up in China and Manchoukuo, the number of troops available for military adventures to the south had a definite limit, and to strike effectively everywhere was impossible. Again, Japan was surrounded by a ring of hostile territories that had declared embargoes on Japanese trade. Its resources and stock piles were limited, and conquests must therefore be made as rapidly as possible and be productive of great economic benefits. The third limitation was a matter of the time Japan could dispose of before our Pacific fleet could be repaired and reinforced from the Atlantic and, with the possible addition of newly completed units, could start a campaign to defeat it in the Far East. Owing to the necessity of attaining a strong position before that happened and of achieving its ends before depletion of its slender resources, Japan would obviously use speed and surprise in all its moves.

In choosing between many objectives the Japanese have kept their own limitations severely in mind and have probably acted wisely. They have directed their attack at the potential threats, the bases which would be most valuable to the American navy in the Far East. Their present objectives are the reduction of British bases north of the equator and the capture of the Philippines, or more particularly the island of Luzon. If Singapore and Manila are lost, the task of American sea and air power will become extremely difficult. In that event, a slow, cautious, risky campaign through the Japanese mandated islands or an advance from the south using distant bases in Australia would be necessary in order to reach the decisive area.

Against the British the Japanese have already achieved a large measure of success. The probable loss of Hongkong can be discounted heavily because the base was too exposed to Japanese attack, too incomplete in its facilities, and too lacking in aerial protection to be of much value. But Singapore is the only naval base in the Far East with facilities to support a fleet. And regardless of its success or failure in holding out against direct attack, much of its value has already been destroyed. Originally situated

3,000 miles from the main Japanese bases, it has been deprived of security from air attacks by the successive pushes of Japan into South China, French Indo-China, Thailand, and the Malay States. The weakness of British resistance in the early weeks of the war may be a warning that we shall have to carry them so far as the war in the Pacific is concerned.

In attacking the American position the Japanese have gone to greater pains. The assaults on Guam, Wake, and Midway were intended to remove exposed American positions from the scene of conflict and, even more, to cut the chain of American aerial reinforcement, for planes being sent to the Philippines followed this route. The Japanese landings in British Borneo may have been partly for the sake of oil, but their strategic purpose was probably to make reinforcement through the South Pacific by way of Australia extremely hard. These two lines of attack were essentially preventive, aimed at stopping any further strengthening of American forces. On the Philippines themselves the Japanese attack has been both military and aerial. Aerial bombings appear to have been half-hearted and only moderately successful, but land attacks took advantage of the fact that General MacArthur's military forces were too few in number to cover all of the many landing places in which the Philippines abound. Having seized a bridgehead, the Japanese would next bring in supporting air power and enlarge the area occupied, all the while threatening landings elsewhere to protect themselves against a too great American concentration against them.

American defense against these attacks has so far been nothing short of brilliant. The army has conserved its air force as did the British when facing the onslaught of the *Luftwaffe*, and it may be doubted that many American planes have been lost. The presence of numerous hostile warships in waters to the south has compelled Japan to employ battle-cruiser escorts for its convoys, a course much to the liking of the army airmen who destroyed the Haruna and probably sent the Kongo to drydock for several months. At the moment of writing, the landings made by Japanese troops have not yet been enlarged to a point of actual peril; but the danger of a full-scale attack is clearly present. Large losses of Japanese man-power have assuredly resulted from the sinking of transports. The American intention of making an attack on the Philippines immensely costly to the enemy appears to have been realized. Incapable of precise measurement but not to be overlooked as factors of military value are the courageous, clear-headed deeds of American seamen, airmen, troops, and marines. The stand of our island outposts, Captain Colin Kelly's sinking of the Haruna, the success of American planes in aerial combats against a more numerous foe are certain to become traditions in our services and set a standard of gallant conduct for later millions to follow.

There have been few tactical surprises in the war beyond the initial attack at Pearl Harbor and the possession by Japan of larger mechanized forces than most American military experts gave it credit for having. The outstanding features have been the potency of aircraft and the magnitude of American and British blunders. In a recent article the writer suggested either unexpected Japanese expertness in aviation or else that the army and navy top men in Hawaii were sound asleep. It is now established that the latter was the case. Japanese aerial enterprise has been outstanding, but the types of planes used against Pearl Harbor, of which at least 25 per cent were destroyed, were not. Details of the tragic failure to take adequate precautions at Pearl Harbor are not yet cleared up, but the services are unlikely to be able to cover up their fatal blunders. Having learned a costly lesson, Americans are not apt to be caught napping again.

British naval losses were even more tragic than ours. Eyewitness accounts of the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse fail to mention the near presence of the destroyers which travel with capital ships to shield them from torpedoes and can supply an enormous volume of anti-aircraft fire in case of attack. The Royal Air Force, brilliant when acting alone but a complete failure at cooperating with land and sea forces, did not have pursuit planes present until both ships were in sinking condition.

Even with all allowance for our own and British blunders and underestimation of the opponent, the Japanese demonstration of the strength of air power has been most impressive. Not the bomber but the torpedo plane has been revealed as the greatest enemy of sea power in the present war. The prolonged resistance of the Bismarck, contrasted with the easy sinking of the Prince of Wales, is an indication that Germany still holds an edge in ship protection. An announcement that the battleship is obsolete would be both premature and inaccurate, but ships must have added protection if they are to survive. Today air power is an integral and absolutely vital part of sea power, and a fleet which is not closely tied up with its own air force is probably doomed. The manner of loss of these two British ships holds a negative lesson for the United States. Of all navies the American has been especially outstanding in its naval aviation. To risk this existing close coordination between sea power and air power in order to experiment with an independent air force, a course now being urged by some air enthusiasts, would be nothing short of a military calamity.

In the Weeks Ahead

Donald W. Mitchell

will analyze military developments regularly for readers of *The Nation*

Hitler's Costliest Gamble

BY ADOLPH B. DRUCKER

THE Red Army's counter-attacks all along the Russian-German front, from the Baltic to the Sea of Azov, are eloquent commentary on von Ribbentrop's recent boast that Soviet resistance has been smashed beyond recovery. Notwithstanding the current Russian successes, however, the fact remains that the German lines still girdle a huge part of the Soviet Union, inhabited by fifty to sixty million people and encompassing roughly half of Russia's agricultural potential, half of its developed mineral resources, three-fifths of its industrial establishment—including armament factories, arsenals, and shipyards—and a great part of its Western civilization and urban life. But even assuming that the Germans will be able to dig in without retreating much farther, it is still pertinent to consider whether Hitler's Russian adventure has not cost him more in military strength than it has given him, or promises to give him, in the way of economic advantage. In this connection two questions arise: First, to what extent has Hitler been able to offset the scarcities in his war economy through Russian food and loot, as his invasion proceeded; second, to what extent will it be possible for him to integrate the sources of production he has acquired as permanent tributaries to his war economy, thus canceling the strangling blockade?

Dazzled by a swift sequence of victories and encouraged by propaganda, the German people have taken for granted that the great resources of Russia, especially the natural wealth of the Ukraine, would be fully accessible to them and that the danger of losing the war through lack of basic materials was over. Sober reflection, however, should have recalled Germany's sad experience during the "peaceful occupation" of the "liberated" Ukraine by German and Austrian armies in 1917-18. This chapter in the history of World War I has not been written down, though it is alive in many minds, including those of the German General Staff. I remember this episode very vividly, having lived through it from beginning to end in the capacity of deputy chairman of the Austrian Economic Commission on the Ukraine, an inter-departmental body set up by the Austrian government for the purpose of regulating the expected influx into Austria-Hungary of food and raw materials supposedly abundant in the Ukraine. Great expectations then as now seemed justified because the military successes were so enormous.

In 1917, after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution and the collapse of the czarist army, the territorial conquests of Germany and its confederates in the east were not less extended than Hitler's hold over Eastern Europe is at present. German armies then stood before Petrograd and not far from Moscow, with Poland and the Baltic regions behind the German lines; the Ukraine was "liberated" and peacefully occupied; the Donetz Basin was in German hands; the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov were German waters. In the southeast the front line of the Central Powers bulged even farther into Russian territory than it does now, and, Turkey being in the same camp, no serious obstacle blocked the path to the Caucasus. The famished populations of the Central Powers were jubilantly awaiting the rich harvests of the Ukraine —wheat, oil, and other raw materials. Elaborate organizations were set up to gather, transport, and distribute the treasure. Economic commissions were appointed for the exploitation of the "Bread Peace." A German general, von Eichhorn, administered the region around Kiev, an Austrian general, von Sendler, governed in Odessa. Transportation of the booty on the Danube River and the Black Sea was placed under a military "Black Sea Command."

In the Ukraine the harvest was already completed. It had been a hot season, and the crops of the country, nowhere damaged by invasion or actual warfare, were supposed to fill all barns to capacity. To the wishful thinking of the statesmen and people of the Central Powers it appeared to be only a technical problem to gather and to transport the bread for which the starved cities of their countries clamored. All that seemed necessary was to offer the Ukrainian peasantry a plausible counter-value for the needed supplies.

These "technical problems" were the subject of a conference held at the Austrian Foreign Office in August, 1917. I attended the conference as a representative of the Austrian Ministry of Commerce and the Commission on the Ukraine, and together with other Austrian advisers suggested that a broad program of agrarian reform be introduced in the Ukraine. The bulk of the Ukrainian peasantry consisted of landless tenants. Of pure Ukrainian (Little Russian) stock and adhering to the Greek Catholic church, the peasants differed from the Orthodox White Russian landowners in race and religion – the relationship between them was analogous in many respects to the historical antagonism between the Roman Catholic Irish tenant and the Protestant English squire or, in the Balkans, the Slavonic Christian *colon* or *kmet*

(tenant) and the Mohammedan Aga, the Turkish landowner.

Our plan was not meant to be a mere emergency measure, devised to lure the peasant into a friendly mood because he held the keys of the larder. A land distribution securing a plot of his own to the land-hungry peasant appeared to be just and timely, likely to counter efficiently the Communist propaganda penetrating the Ukraine from Bolshevist Russia. The Austrian reform program, however, was turned down. The German General Staff, reactionary to the core, preferred administrative and military compulsion and an alliance with the landed aristocracy against the peasants. Creating an "independent" Ukraine, the Central Powers chose as their puppet and executive a *Hetman* from the ranks of the hated landowners, first Skuropatzky and then Petlura of bloody pogrom fame.

The character of a peaceful occupation was stressed by supplementing military requisitions with commercial purchases and unredeemable requisition receipts with money. In accordance with the best banking theory—an eminent German banker saw to the show side of this business—a Ukrainian National Bank was brought into existence. Its notes held a suspended gold promise and were "covered" in their gold value by credit accounts amounting to several million Kronen and Reichsmarks in the books of the Austro-Hungarian Bank and the Deutsche Reichsbank. Both currencies, Krone and Reichsmark, at this time being almost entirely bare of any substantial gold cover, the new Ukrainian currency was probably the most artful and deceptive specimen of *Deckung* currency ever tried until Hitler invented the "occupation mark." The notes were made exclusive legal tender and put in circulation by the military authorities; it was expected that by this means all salable food and goods in the country would be driven into the desired channels.

Only picayune results, however, were obtained from all these preparations. The Ukrainian peasant did not collaborate with the occupation authorities. Though there was then no official "scorched-earth" policy, the stocks disappeared, buried or burned by the peasants. The new money did not impress the peasant as a real equivalent, and little could be obtained by purchase. Offers to barter much-needed agricultural implements and tools—of which the conqueror countries themselves had little to spare—found no response. Very little grain or other supplies left the Ukraine for Austria or Germany. When General Alfred Krauss—later the first of the old imperial generals to join the Nazi Party in Austria—prevailed upon the reluctant Emperor Charles to drop the mask of a "peaceful" occupation and to try the "iron fist," the refractory attitude of the peasantry grew into open resistance. General von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev. The whole elaborate organization, including the Black Sea Command, finally broke down; and then the victory of the Allies and the Treaty of Versailles forced the Central Powers to retire from all occupied territories in Russia.

In 1941 the invading German armies are in urgent need, as they were in 1917, of foodstuffs, iron and steel, other strategic metals, fuel, and oil. Most of these needs were included in the Soviet-German trade agreement that was signed simultaneously with the Non-Aggression Pact in August, 1939. Disappointing experience led to stringent amendments of this commercial arrangement in February, 1940, and though results remained unsatisfactory, Germany actually received from Russia great quantities of wheat, oats, barley, fodder, and oil, and even one million tons of manganese, chrome, and antimony from the Ural mines. But Germany needed still more.

In the south of Russia, notably in the Ukraine, Hitler expected to obtain at least 800,000,000 bushels of grain, together with sugar beets, cotton, and flax. And he expected to deprive the enemy at the same time of 20 per cent of his vital food supplies and of important quantities of textile fibers. Even more ambitious expectations seemed to be justified. Having been industrially developed under a planned economy, the occupied country now seemed to offer to the conqueror abundant technical equipment for processing local raw materials, particularly coal and iron. Since 1917 great industrial centers had come into being in the south of Russia, methodically located around the iron-ore district of Krivoj Rog, the coal mines of the Donetz, the electric power of the Dnieper. The pig-iron capacity of the Donetz Basin had risen from 5,000,000 tons in 1918 to 10,000,000 tons in 1940, and a huge steel industry had been built on this basis. The pits, mines, and factories in the western part of the basin were worked by means of new electric power generated by the Dnieper plant. Rich storehouses, a gigantic working arsenal, well-equipped shipyards in Odessa, Kherson, Nikolaev, and Mariupol, and, only one step farther, the oil wells of the Caucasus seemed ready for immediate exploitation by the conqueror. The enemy, moreover, would be weakened at the same rate at which the German war potential was strengthened.

None of these hopes have been fulfilled—not the short-term plan for immediate booty, nor the expectation that the Ukraine could quickly be converted into a German arsenal, nor the expected paralysis of Russia's war production.

When the Germans attacked Russia, the fields were still green; the harvest, scarcely begun, was interrupted by the mobilization of many hands and by the invasion. The great central barns of the collective farms, where the crops are stored under the Soviet agrarian

system, were empty. Military grain and flour magazines and local stocks retained from last year for the use of the resident population, in quantity only a fraction of the total crops, were either hastily removed before the Nazi onslaught or burned by enemy action or by the Russians themselves under the "scorched-earth" policy. Nor was it easy to proceed with the harvest behind the advancing German lines; all along the spreading front the uncut fields were trampled by troops and tanks.

Where the fields were undamaged, agricultural workers were scarce, and where, behind the German lines, the hands could be assembled, new administrative and technical problems faced the invader. The new Russian methods of collective agriculture depend on complete motorization. But the tractors and other field machinery were either removed or destroyed, and they could not easily be replaced out of German stocks. Nor could the available hands be set to work immediately without using so far as possible the efficient and familiar methods of Russian collective farming. The Germans tried to give the *kholhoz* organization the shape of rural work *cadres*, pseudo-cooperatives under central leadership. Struggling with all these complex administrative and technical difficulties in the midst of a flaming *Blitzkrieg*, they were outraced by the early advent of winter. The remnants of the harvest of 1941 could not be saved. German reports boast of finding great quantities of butter and count the cattle on the collective farms but are remarkably reticent concerning grain and other crops. The conclusion is warranted that Hitler's conquest of Russia's main food-producing region failed to yield the expected immediate results. In fact, Germany had got far more out of its previous trade agreement with Stalin.

Moreover, there is reason to doubt that the harvests of occupied Russia next year—or in following years—will decisively improve the food situation that is worrying Hitler. With the exception of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, no country now under his rule was ever self-sufficient in food, and even these former surplus areas are now reduced to scarcity. The practice of starving the vanquished has its obvious political limits. And not only might Russia be unable to fill the hole in Hitler's bread basket, but the fifty or sixty million Russian people in the conquered territory might become dependent for their daily bread upon supplies from Germany and thus turn the conquest into a serious liability. Hitler can only prevent this by obtaining the full collaboration of the Russian farm worker. But the task of turning the minds of millions of Russians from collectivism to German fascism, of undoing the educational, political, and institutional achievements of twenty-four years of Soviet rule, is not made easier by being urgent.

Failure in this task is predicted for the simple reason that in handling the human and psychological side of his adventure Hitler has blundered politically. His war cry against collectivism and his sweeping promise to restore private ownership of farm land, designed to win over the peasant by appealing to his presumed anti-collectivist feelings, might have been timely in 1917 but comes much too late in 1941. It is likewise too late to appeal to separatist Ukrainian sentiment; with a great many other nationalities the Ukrainians have been integrated into the Soviet state, and a strong all-Russian patriotism has been developed in them by a policy of allowing a great deal of autonomy within a centralized system. Actually many Ukrainians are prominent in Russia's cultural, political, and economic life. Moreover, there is understandable doubt in the mind of the Russian worker as to who it is to whom Hitler intends to restore the land: greatest of all political blunders, Germany has again allied itself with the reactionary class of pre-revolutionary landowners. Again the German war lord is temporarily master of the richest soil in Europe, only to see himself once more deprived of its coveted fruits.

Equal disappointment awaited Hitler if he hoped to find in the mining and industrial sections of conquered Russia a workable arsenal, with adequate man-power available, with accessible stocks of the basic materials, coal and iron, and equipped with machinery and driving power. Germany's own ample resources of coal and iron (including imports from Sweden) are strengthened by its control of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and France. But mechanized war is insatiable, and an arsenal behind the front would be an additional advantage. All these hopes were drowned in the floods of the bursting Dnieper dam, when the huge Dnieper hydroelectric plant was blasted by the retreating Russians. According to expert information, mining and industrial activities in the western part of the Donetz Basin have been paralyzed for a long time to come. Pits are a quagmire of stagnant water, broken props, and submerged machinery. It would take a year of pumping, according to the best-informed experts, to restore workable order in the pits, and this would require the replacement of all mechanical equipment. In addition, the steel plants are reported to be completely unworkable, the fleeing workers having left molten pig iron in the cooling furnaces, which now are ruined beyond repair.

Reconstruction is a huge technical problem, requiring not only time but great quantities of materials already so scarce that their use is forbidden to German industry for renovation and replacement purposes. Besides, the reconditioning of an industrial system behind the front lines of military operations is dependent upon two important conditions: first, a willing, dependable army of trained workmen; and, second, absence of disturbances caused by actions of war. The first condition is not secured even in occupied countries far away from the theater of war, as, for example, Czechoslovakia. The

second condition, implying a lull in the war, was envisaged by Germany as the result of a quick victory over Russia that never materialized.

Turned back by military defeat from entrance into Russia's oil fields, Hitler sees another dream shattered. He was thoroughly prepared for victory; pipe lines had been prefabricated and shipped to the front. After acquiring the minor oil production of Galicia, he expected to extend his conquests to Grozny, Maikop, and even Apsheron (Baku). This plan likewise miscarried. At the same time he has lost the oil delivered to him by Russia under the trade agreement, and has depleted his supplies in all theaters of the war by the enormous demands of the Russian campaign.

As far as its own loss in material and equipment is concerned, Russia has not been dealt a deadly blow, though it would be foolish to underrate the magnitude of the damage. So far, no reports of critical scarcities have come from Russia, and its vigorous offensive indicates abundance of material. The territory behind the Russian lines produces 80 per cent of the country's needs in food; in these regions—Central Russia, Siberia, and the Caucasus—harvests and deliveries have not been disturbed. Besides—cold comfort, but an important item—the food requirements of about 60,000,000 Russians in occupied territory are for the time being no longer the charge of Russia.

Mutilated Russia has still a coal production of 70,000,000 tons, not counting the rich potential production of the pits of Kuznetz in Siberia. Steel production has been halved, but 10,000,000 tons are still produced behind the Russian lines, notably in Magnitogorsk and other industrial centers. Thus the basic materials of armament production are not deficient; new mines of manganese, iron ore, and bauxite are now being opened. With equipment saved from the grasp of the invading German armies in the west and brought to the center and east of the country, new armament factories are being set to work. It appears that the great western arsenals—the famous Voroshilov plant and the Petrovsky and Czerczinsky works—have been successfully transferred and reorganized behind the Russian front. Airplane production is now in full blast far from any interference by Hitler's bombers. More important still, Russia is accessible to imports from the outer world. The deeper strategic plan of the Axis, namely, to encircle the blockade of the Allies with an outer blockade, is still far from achievement.

A Warning from South America

BY AN ANONYMOUS DIPLOMAT

SOUTH AMERICA has been one of the battlefields of the Second World War from the day of its declaration. Until now, the warfare waged there has been political and consequently has been devoid of dramatic spectacles. However, in all South American republics, carefully organized in every possible detail, there exists a secret army, created by agents of the Third Reich, which has been trained especially for the struggle in that continent and which has made use of the services of German residents and the descendants of Germans.

The totalitarian action in South America reveals two distinct periods. Before 1940, Nazism was a growing, impulsive, revolutionary movement which took advantage of every favorable opportunity. It was characterized by uninterrupted propaganda attacks through newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, radio stations, and also by attempts to bring pressure on private individuals through personal contacts. Its action was spectacular, provocative, and brutal. In cases where it found weak governments, or willing accomplices, as in the case of the de facto government of Dr. Gabriel Terra in Uruguay, from 1933 to 1938, it demonstrated its audacity by even parading its storm troops on the roads in the interior of the republic, playing its march, one of the lines of which is the following: "Free streets for the storm troops." Brazil offered a vivid example in 1935 and 1937 of that technique of provocation. There the well-trained Nazi squadrons dominated the populous colonies and the industrial towns of the South. In São Paulo and also in Rio the "Green Shirts" (Brazilian Integralista Alliance) led by Plinio Salgado, and Newton Cavalcanti—a Brazilian general who today awards decorations in the United States to American military and naval officers in the name of the government of Getulio Vargas—shattered the traditionally calm tropical atmosphere with their hysterical *anahué*, a cry of victory taken from the war songs of the primitive Indians.

Their activities at that time met no serious obstacles. Encouraged by their immunity, they naturally became bolder and bolder. Coups d'état, armed subversive action, sabotage on a wide scale characterized the expansion of the movement in this stage. However, in 1940 an agency of the Uruguayan government unearthed a plot to seize the country; public opinion in America was shaken to its very roots, and the popular masses suddenly demonstrated their powerful democratic feeling

by demanding, in every affected country, that their government leaders take immediate repressive measures. Soon, through legislative action and decrees promulgated by the governments, a distinct reaction was felt, tending to halt the bold totalitarian methods. In July of the same year the Havana conference, recognizing the Nazi threat to the continent from both within and without, adopted a series of conventions which might have been effective had they been conscientiously applied. The Nazi attack was resisted by continental public opinion.

Up to July, 1941, there was no radical change in Nazi methods. On the contrary, Hitler seemed bent upon diverting to this hemisphere the political attention of the United States, which at that time was timidly but irresistibly led by events toward the issue of armed conflict. Between the months of May and July plots were discovered in Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Colombia. A Balkan conflict in the Americas threatened a dangerous breach in the system of continental security envisaged by the diplomats of the United States Department of State. Behind the boundary dispute between Peru and Ecuador could be found Nazis, Italian Fascists, Phalangists, and the Japanese.

The second period began when the United States actually, physically, entered the war, when its Atlantic fleet established the vital line of supply to far-away Iceland, when German submarines began to inflict punishment upon American ships on all the seas of the planet. We are still in the midst of that second period, and it presents a surprising parallel to the tactics adopted by Germany toward England in initiating the Russian campaign. Hitler's agents turn away and apparently abandon the field of political warfare, just as the airplanes of the *Luftwaffe* abandoned the sky over the British Isles. It is their purpose to create a false state of confidence, thus weakening the tense attention which had been aroused in responsible Latin American circles.

The storm troops have withdrawn from the scene in South America. Propaganda has taken a stealthy and invisible turn. The provocative tunes of the young Germans born in South America are no longer heard. Governments of guilty conscience find it an opportune moment to issue hypocritical assurances that all is well. When the Department of State accepts or appears to accept this version of the situation, it agrees with the Berlin radio, through which the propagandists of Goebbels have assured the world that South American anxiety was merely the fruit of Anglo-Yankee policy.

Then came the war of the Pacific with its attendant surprises, which the appeasers had reserved for the people of the United States as a Christmas present.

Today the fifth columns solidly established in some governments in South America have taken the floor. Tomorrow the cannon and torpedoes of the Japanese warships in the Pacific and South Atlantic will speak. What will then happen in Peru, Argentina, and Brazil? What will happen in the rest of the continent if these countries fall into the hands of puppet governments which will use the great riches of the South American subsoil to cover the war needs of the Axis powers?

The government of Getulio Vargas has said that it will solidly support the United States in the defense of the hemisphere. The American Foreign Ministers will hold a new consultative conference in Rio de Janeiro in January. It will be gratifying to the officials of the United States Department of State to consult with the titular Foreign Minister of Brazil, the friendly Oswaldo Aranha. Mr. Aranha is very amiably and convincingly pro-democratic, but he will be accompanied by the actual Foreign Minister, Francisco Campos, the totalitarian technician of the Brazilian government, author of the book which supplies the doctrinal justification of the vertical dictatorship set up by Vargas; Campos, the friend of Federzoni, president of the Italian Senate, who upon examining the Brazilian constitution of 1938 declared that it was a model of fascist learning. They will also meet with General Eurico Dutra, Chief of Staff of the army, and General Goes Monteiro, public apologists of a German victory. These two, who were decorated by Hitler in May, 1940, for "valuable services rendered to Germany by Brazil," will graciously place themselves at the service of pan-Americanism, solely to please their good friends of the Department of State. The propaganda of the conference will be in the hands of Lourival Fontes, chief of Brazil's military mission in the United States, who from his place of exile in Portugal commanded the criminal troops of the Green Shirts and who has recently drawn up a manifesto, widely distributed in Brazil, advising his fellow-Brazilian Nazis to give unconditional support to Vargas.

At the January meeting will also be present Dr. Ruiz Guiñazú, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the government of Ramón Castillo, Acting President of Argentina. Dr. Guiñazú, after having been named Minister of Foreign Affairs, while on his way through Spain to accept his post made emotional statements before the Alcazar at Toledo, eulogizing the glorious resistance of that military bastion against "red hordes." Surely, Dr. Ruiz Guiñazú will explain to the conference in Rio why Dr. Castillo declared a state of siege in order to protect his friendship with the United States of North America, a friendship which has been paradoxically expressed by police suppression of every evidence of popular sympathy toward the United States and its President.

Possibly, too, Marshal Oscar Benavides will participate in the conference at Rio. He is the power behind the throne of Prado Ugarteche, the smiling "democrat" who heads the prison-like democracy of Peru. Benavides, who at the time he was ambassador to Spain showed his intense Phalangist sympathies, felt even

at that distance the strong popular movement growing in his country. To be nearer, he had himself transferred to Buenos Aires, and from there he was able to exert his influence on the internal policy of Peru through his associate, Prado Ugarteche, the President who today talks about democracy while he makes concessions to the Japanese which are historically inexcusable, and who imprisons all those who advocate a government established on a popular basis which would lead the Peruvian people to a complete continental solidarity.

At this historic moment it is the fifth columns existing within the governments themselves which will speak in South America, and speak for South America. The Hitler agents have become silent. They have practically stopped their propaganda. In that way the illusion of fraternity among the American countries will be maintained. Complacency, that psychological agent which Hitler employs in whatever section of the world constitutes his next immediate objective, will reign in the conference at Rio.

The reader must keep in mind several significant facts. The Japanese fleet, which in all probability has bases in the south of Chile or in the distant islands of Juan Fernández, as the Germans had at the time of the First World War, may at any time commit acts of piracy which will make the Straits of Magellan and the Rio de la Plata war-zone waters. The South Atlantic is dangerously unprepared to meet the possible and foreseeable attacks of the Japanese corsairs. What would happen if the French ships and the base of Dakar were utilized by the Germans, and to these forces were to be added Japanese ships coming unhindered through the Straits? It is possible that in such a case the governments which have been making a show of their hypocritical friendship for the United States would drop all pretenses.

If the United States does not inaugurate swift, effective political action in Latin America, in order to clear the continent of Nazis, Phalangists, Fascist Italians, and Japanese agents, that political war which the Axis countries started eight years ago will become a military war. Then it would be necessary to exchange, if it were still possible, if there were yet time, the pacific intervention through which North America could today save democracy and which the American peoples would acclaim unanimously, for military intervention; and then the Nazis, with their genius for intrigue, would have little difficulty in proving that this intervention was nothing but a revival of the old United States policy of the "big stick."

From Scrap to Tanks

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

WASTE has always been an integral part of the high American standard of living. Until comparatively recently our resources appeared so inexhaustible that conservation seldom seemed worth the expenditure of labor and thought that it involved. So we have slashed our forests and mined our soil. When factories or farms or mines ceased to give quick returns, we have left them derelict and passed on to something else. As individual consumers, too, we have been careless about waste. We have eagerly responded to advertising appeals to junk whatever is slightly outmoded, and our tendency has been to discard any damaged article rather than bother to have it repaired. In households where poverty has not applied the spur to thrift, there has always been wastage of food. Leftovers clutter up the refrigerator, and their utilization demands time and thought; so away they go into the garbage pail.

Now we are in a total war which is going to make ravenous demands on our resources, and freedom to waste is among the luxuries we must sacrifice for the duration. In the case of food, mounting prices and the assaults of the tax-collector on incomes will combine to enforce the many sermons we are now hearing on the subject of domestic economy. And the actual disappearance from the stores of all kinds of things to which we have been accustomed is going to make it essential for us to get along with the gadgets we already have and to take greater care of them. But as individuals we also have a positive contribution to make in overcoming the scarcity of certain resources—the expenditure of effort in preserving various kinds of scrap material and in seeing that it is collected for industrial use.

Before the war broke out, we used to laugh at the Nazis' collection of toothpaste tubes, but their highly organized system for obtaining and utilizing so-called waste has been an important factor in keeping their war machine running. Britain has found it expedient to follow their example. British housewives today are encouraged to supplement the once inclusive ash can with four separate containers designed to receive, respectively, food waste suitable for pigs; bones; tin cans and other old metal; and all forms of waste paper. The collection of this material is undertaken by the municipal authorities, who sort it out and sell it to pig farmers and the scrap

merchants, in many cases achieving a profit. Hundreds of thousands of tons of such scrap are being handled annually, and the British Controller of Salvage has estimated that the resulting saving is equivalent to 250 ship voyages annually.

Up to April of the current year enough metal was collected from British households to build 10,000 tanks. The old bones—still usable after the dog has had a go at them—provide raw material for glue, fertilizer, glycerine, and other products. The paper is pulped and used to make fresh paper and board. As the salvage appeals point out, paper is an essential war material, for apart from its normal uses it is employed in making shell containers and in building board, and as a filler for certain kinds of plastic it enters into the manufacture of planes and radio apparatus. Since Britain has to import practically all the wood pulp it consumes, the utilization of waste paper offers great possibilities in saving shipping. And so great is the need that no possible source is being overlooked. Government offices and business firms alike are hauling out their old records to be converted into pulp. Even bus tickets are carefully saved, every vehicle being provided with a receptacle into which passengers are urged to drop their tickets before dismounting.

In this country we may not need to bother about old bones, but we are already being urged by Washington to save old paper and cardboard of all kinds and see that it is passed on to the junk dealers or some collection agency, such as the Salvation Army. For in pre-war years we imported a great deal of pulp from Scandinavia, and although increased production in Canada has partially filled the gap, defense is making heavy demands on the paper and paper-board industry. The utilization of waste paper for coarser products serves to release fresh pulp for the making of cellulose, which has many chemical applications, including the manufacture of explosives.

The problem of scrap collection is now being handled by the OPM's Bureau of Conservation, headed by Lessing Rosenwald, who is reported to be planning a direct appeal to the public to turn in old metal. Now that our supplies of raw rubber from the East are cut off, at least temporarily, it seems probable that an effort will also be made to haul in old tires and other rubber waste suitable for reclaiming.

Few people realize how important scrap iron and steel are as raw materials. Last year total consumption exceeded 40,000,000 tons, with steel mills using about 45 per cent scrap to 55 per cent pig iron in their open-hearth furnaces. In producing castings, foundries consume about 70 per cent scrap to 30 per cent pig iron. The collection of this material is a major industry. A fairly large proportion is supplied by the waste produced within the steel industry itself, and a good deal more is sold direct to the mills by the railroads. Wholesale scrap dealers round up the remainder, drawing mostly from big producers, such as metal factories, automobile junkshops, shipyards, and the like. They do not find it economic to collect small lots, and the scope of their operations is limited by high freight rates to areas within a few hundred miles of the steel mills. Of course, both these obstacles to a larger scrap supply would be overcome if a high enough price were obtainable.

Soon after the defense program was launched, prices did begin to rise under the stimulus of increased demand, but Leon Henderson stepped in and placed a ceiling on scrap with a view to keeping down the cost of steel production and heading off a demand for higher steel prices. In this he was successful, but the result has been to restrict the supply of scrap, which at the present time is said to be below normal. One concession has been made by the Office of Price Administration: for a limited period purchasers have been allowed to pay a higher price for "remote scrap," that is to say, material originating in states west of the Mississippi, so as to overcome the freight handicap. But this step has done little to remedy the shortage, which is now described as desperate. Several steel mills are today operating below capacity solely owing to their inability to obtain sufficient scrap.

The gathering in of steel scrap in small lots from a multitude of workshops, factories, and farms is an expensive operation, for a great deal of labor is involved in the many calls necessary and also in sorting. To make it worth while and to attract the necessary new capital to the petty junk business, the present price ceiling would have to be raised considerably. But this would naturally mean equally high prices for scrap collected in bulk, which already returns a reasonable profit and would almost certainly lead to increased prices for finished steel. Must we risk such a breach in the whole structure of price control in order to bring out this urgently needed marginal supply of scrap?

I believe that before the OPM resorts to this kind of price leverage it should see what can be done by patriotism and voluntary organization. The Bureau of Conservation is already reported to be sending an appeal to all factory owners, utility companies, and the like to appoint a company official who will make a thorough search of the plant for "dormant" steel and other metal scrap. Test surveys of this kind have turned up obsolete machinery, old pipe, and all sorts of forgotten material in quantities which could well be handled through the regular scrap merchants. But if appeals are to be made to small businesses and householders, some further organization to supervise the primary collection will be necessary.

The Bureau of Conservation should issue a call to every community in the country to organize a scrap-collection committee. The lead might be taken by the local council, by some charitable organization, or by a community club such as Rotary. In cities, no doubt, sub-

committees for each section would be desirable so as to divide up the work and stimulate interest. I do not believe it would be difficult to find citizens willing to lend their services for a house-to-house canvass to persuade the occupants to make a thorough search for old metal. In many places organizations such as the Boy Scouts or the 4-H Clubs would be glad to assist. Probably many people approached would bring their contributions personally to a community dump. When bulky hoards were uncovered, local business men willing to lend a truck could certainly be found. As the piles accumulated, scrap dealers could be called in and asked to give a bulk price, the proceeds being donated to the Red Cross or some local charity.

With efficient organization I believe that very large quantities of scrap could be uncovered, especially in suburban areas, small towns, and villages. In such places people tend to stay many years in one house. They have attics, garages, and barns, and they are apt to accumulate all sorts of lumber which they have put away thinking they might have some use for it some day. Old iron bedsteads, lengths of gutter, old taps and pipes, bits of cars, broken tools, discarded lamps, old radiators, stoves and grates—some or all of these things are to be found in almost any country household, and their owners would be glad to part with them knowing they were to be metamorphosed into tanks, guns, and shells. Farms in particular should yield rich hauls of this kind of material, together with discarded or broken implements. And it is well to remember that the fact that a piece of steel is rusty does not make it worthless as scrap.

Other sources of scrap in many rural areas are the unsightly relics of long-abandoned enterprises—saw mills, quarries, mines, and small factories. Walking down from Jay Peak in Vermont's Green Mountains last summer by an almost overgrown trail, I remember coming across a huge boiler half hidden in the undergrowth. With various accessories scattered around, it must have weighed at least two tons. To break up and move such an object would not be a commercial proposition; nor could it be easily done by volunteer amateurs. But it might be worth while for the government to use some of the CCC boys in tracking down and removing scrap of this nature. A double purpose would be achieved, since in addition to gaining the use of the metal we would get a cleaner countryside. Probably some legislation would be needed to enable the government to commandeer abandoned property of this kind, particularly since it would often be impossible to trace the owner.

In maintaining national unity few things count so much as giving as many people as possible a job to do which they feel is making a contribution, however humble, toward winning the war. Hundreds of thousands of citizens are already working for civil defense, but there are plenty of others who could be rallied to a volunteer salvage corps by a government appeal imaginative enough to make clear the vital importance of the task. But the campaign will have to be more carefully thought out and organized than was last summer's aluminum collection if it is to gain full public cooperation.

[*This article replaces in this issue Mr. Hutchison's fortnightly column Everybody's Business.*]

In the Wind

NEW REGULATIONS for the conduct of enemy aliens forbid German or Italian refugees to congregate in large numbers. What is meant by "large numbers" has not yet been settled, but one of the established agencies for helping anti-fascist refugees has felt obliged to cancel its New Year's Eve party because of this ruling.

WILLIAM DUDLEY PELLEY, leader of the Silver Shirts, has suspended publication of his paper. . . . Seward Collins, former editor of the *American Review*, a pro-fascist journal, closed his New York bookshop right after our entry into war. A few months ago Collins went out to Geneva, Wisconsin, to help edit *Scribner's Commentator*.

JAN VALTIN has offered his services to our armed forces and may be used in counter-espionage work.

A LARGE FACTION within America First is eager to continue the committee's work in some fashion. Many of the local branches, which are separately incorporated and cannot be disbanded by ukase from General Wood, may simply adopt a new name and continue their activities.

AN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER now engaged in building tanks was discussing with an army officer the advisability of using a new device in casting the turrets on our medium-sized tanks. It was pointed out by the industrialist that while our tank turrets turn only 220 degrees, German turrets can turn 360 degrees. The army officer replied that "the American army never retreats" and hence would not need tanks with turrets that could face the rear. Production was halted for a while, but now the turrets can turn a full circle.

REPRESENTATIVE CARL VINSON, who is preparing a bill to apply corporation tax laws to labor unions, has received answers to a questionnaire he sent out on union funds. One of the revelations is that since the beginning of the defense program $20,000,000 has been collected in dues and assessments. The figure is surprisingly small, but Vinson will give it wide publicity to show the need for his bill.

SENATOR WHEELER has not been to Washington since war began. From his home office a statement was given out that he would not go to the capital "until something of vital importance comes up."

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Liberty Will Survive

SOLDIERS watching a railroad bridge in Raleigh picked up a white and a Negro hobo in the first week of war and told the police to "hold them for the army" without making any charge against them. An intemperate Kansas City lawyer, writing to a Congressman who had criticized the navy at Pearl Harbor, cracked in possibly disloyal contempt at the Congress and the President, too. He was arrested. A man booed the President's picture in a Chicago theater and got pummeled by his neighbors and fined by a judge on Bill of Rights Day. In the Southern Appalachian country some nighttime patriot threw a rock at the window of a store operated by an American-born Japanese. In Washington an energetic idiot chopped down some Japanese cherry trees. Beyond idiots in war, we may fear with Attorney General Francis Biddle that some officials will exercise necessary war powers and enforce essential war laws "unjustly, brutally, stupidly." No wonder liberals are concerned about civil liberties in war time, discussing the question, holding meetings about it. But the important thing for liberals is that they face the danger with at least as much good sense as they are ready to demand of officials.

That ought not to be hard. If this war is the cause of any people, it is the cause of the liberals. Everything they believe in is at stake. There are conservatives in America who conceivably might live quite comfortably under totalitarianism. There are radicals who might find its sweeping, ruthless patterns entirely satisfactory if they could swap their labels. But liberals and liberalism are going to be smashed or saved in a war in which the opponents of democracy will not be squeamish about their methods or considerate of any rules.

There remain some bad home memories about the last war—and there are some disturbing signs already in this one. I cannot follow but I can understand the fears that Colonel Lindbergh helped minimize by trying to magnify when he declared that "if we go to war to preserve democracy abroad, we are likely to end by losing it at home." But that choice of going to war is gone. We didn't choose war; we were knocked into it. We are undoubtedly trying to preserve democracy abroad, but we began fighting for it in defense under deliberate attack. Now certainly we may expect—indeed, as sensible people, welcome—some limitation on the freedom of the individual as a basis for the safety of us all. The only choice we have left is the choice of survival—for ourselves and the kind of people in the kind of countries which made freedom on this earth.

At such a time there is no rigid, intellectually fixed and comfortable pattern for the lazy-minded liberal. It is no longer possible to drop instantly and without doubt into a fixed slot marked "For civil liberties." Every sensible person knows that the meaning of liberty in the matter of lighted windows is different under bombers from what it is when the windows are merely under the stars. I have forgotten whether it was Justice Holmes or Brandeis who said that the right of free speech did not include the right to shout "Fire" in a crowded theater. And no mere legalistic adherence to rules about liberty will apply in a burning world.

Does that mean that liberals should relinquish for the duration their faith in the freedoms at home? In my opinion it certainly does not. If we can trust the only leader we have to trust, the President does not think that. The freedoms stand. The law remains. The democratic processes are intact. Also, however, discipline in the cause of freedom is here. Liberals are not merely lawyers. There is comfort in a Constitution, but the real strength of our Bill of Rights has always been in the American heart. Lincoln remained a friend of freedom when he suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Democracy survived the war powers of Wilson. It survived even the stupidities of some prosecutors and judges, their stupidities of injustice. It will not be destroyed by a President who leads the whole world for liberty. Francis Biddle is Attorney General and not Mitchell Palmer.

Liberty will survive. America has made its decision about that. But people will be hurt at home in the process. We shall be sorry about that by and by when the nation has time for such sorrow. Decent liberals cannot neglect them now. But good liberals can act with good sense. Nothing is more important than that they waste no time or influence in protests about technicalities at a time when the creative function of the liberal is more important than it has ever been. The right of free speech stands, but the duty of careful speech grows. Criticism is important; a hearing can best be preserved for it by temperance in its use. Finally, the liberal must demand of himself at least as wise a head as he expects from others. Certainly this is not a time for liberal fears but for liberal fighting. Obviously friends of freedom have a home cause they need to watch, but even more obviously they have a world cause calling for all the vitality which may be in them.

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

POEMS FROM LATIN AMERICA

TRANSLATED BY ROLFE HUMPHRIES

The Drill

BY MIGUEL OTERO SILVA
(Venezuela)

The drill enters the earth,
Venezuelan earth.
The Venezuelan man
sweats, and sweats again.

Rattle of Yankee machines,
Cry of the Yankee engineer.

The drill enters and breaks
Earth and stone, earth and stone,
Venezuelan earth,
Venezuelan stone.

The man sweats by the well,
The Venezuelan man,
Earth and sweat on the shoulder,
Mud of his native earth.

Muscles are taut and strong,
Venezuelan men,
Mulatto, Indian, Negro,
Opening up the womb
Of the Venezuelan mother.

Rattle of Yankee machines,
Cry of the Yankee engineer,
Steam in the Yankee boilers.

Through the shining pipes
Goes the singing oil,
Song of the unreturning!

Out in the roadstead waits
The smoke of the Yankee steamer.

The Venezuelan men
Are coming home to the shanties,
Dirty and tired and hungry.
Four malarial children
Eating the dirt for food.
A trickle of greenish water
Gives the warning of fever.
His woman is waiting for him
Disheveled and full of fear:
She knows that machines at times
Crush the life out of men.
The table is waiting for him
With the everlasting beans.

The oil goes into the tanker.
Rockefeller's accounts,
Thermometer of the dollars,
Are rising, rising, rising.
In England Deterding
Dreams of highways of pounds
To make the Channel crossing.

Palaces, yachts, and churches,
Cabarets, limousines
Are always being born.
(Far off, in Venezuela
Four malarial children
Are eating the dirt for food.)

Royal Dutch, Standard Oil!
How the stocks are rising,
The dividends increasing!
Venezuelan oil,
Unreturning oil.

The drill enters the earth,
Venezuelan earth.

Rattle of Yankee machines,
Cry of the Yankee engineer,
Passage of Yankee boats.

The Venezuelan man
Sweats, and sweats again.

Metal and Rock in Their Glances

BY NICOLAS GUILLEN
(Cuba)

Not Cortes, nor Pizarro
(Aztecs, Incas, hitched to the double wagon),
Rather, their rough men
Leaping time. Here with their shields:
Here with their rough and calloused hands:
Distant soldiers, here at our feet,
Their rowels digging the ponies:
Finally here with us,
Soldiers from far off,
Brothers very near.

The ringing iron
Of conquering spears
Swords that aim at the dawn:
Gray armor, the fiery arquebuses,
The nails and the horseshoes
For the small-hooved conquering ponies:
Helmet and visor,
The thick boss of the kneeguard,

All the old imperialist metal
Runs molten in burning rivers
Where soldier, worker, and artist
Gather bullets for the machine-guns.
Not Cortes, nor Pizarro
(Aztecs, Incas, hitched to the double wagon).
Rather, their rough men
Leaping time. Here, with their shields.

Look at Spain, broken!
Birds flying over the ruins
Fascism iron-booted
The street lamps dead at the corners
Fists raised, hearts aroused,
Shells bursting on the sidewalk
Over horses, dead beyond question;
Salt and brackish tears
Choking the very harbors;
Cries that rise to the lips
Angry eyes, wide-open,
Metal and rock in their glances.

"Like That White Cloud"

BY LEON FELIPE
(Mexico)

Yesterday my love,
Like that white cloud, would move
Inhabiting the sky
Alone, aloft, on high,
On high, aloft, alone,
Beside the silver moon.

The cloud, aloft, alone,
Beside the silver moon
Tomorrow falls, to be
Drowned in the bitter sea,
Drowned, like my love, in bitter
Savor of salt and water.

As water in its round
Goes and returns again
Heavenward in the cloud
And seaward in the rain,
So, like the water, given
Its round, my love appears
Soaring in dreams to heaven,
Falling to sea in tears.

The Sacrificed

BY AGUSTI BARTRA
(Spain)

It is the world's fault that they are root and silence
In the earth shaken by the rough rage of the guns.
None has the right to weep for them, nor beat them down again
With the clatter of bells, words, oratorical speeches.
Only the great winds, the great wild winds
And the silent purity of the heavens.
Only, in the reawakening of the landscape
The slow ascension of faithful spirits.

None has the right to sing them. Their anguish
Draws down the grass that has risen over their graves.
It is the crime of the world that they died without joy,
That infinity without sleep has broken their foreheads.

Like a river without a name in a homesick country,
Tears of time, sob of an unreposeful spring.

Dawn, Tent T-1

BY AGUSTI BARTRA

The watery thread of my sleep is broken;
Why this rosy sweetness tremulous over our foul reality, asleep?
Why this airy bloom covering the canal where the rotten rinds of our lives are floating?
Soon the bugle will cry aloud:
Cock of tragic metal!

Agde Concentration Camp, July, 1939

The New Test of Free Speech

CENSORSHIP, 1917. By James R. Mock. Princeton University Press. $2.50.

FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Harvard University Press. $4.

WHATEVER else the new war may hold, it is certain that the American people must face this important question: How much censorship shall we have, how much suppression of the rights of free speech, a free press, and free assembly? The question is a difficult one, but three aspects of it are perfectly plain. First, there was too much suppression in the last war. Second, the question will not end with the war. Third, the question is today more acute than it was in 1917.

Mr. Mock's valuable book furnishes us with an interesting picture of the censorship machinery of 1917. Accepting some form of censorship as inevitable in modern war, Mr. Mock does not attempt to say where it should end. His principal concern is to warn us against allowing selfish groups to prolong war-time censorship after the emergency has passed. The warning is needed, but even in time of war we dare not grant the right of unlimited censorship to government, and it is essential to set down the principles by which both government and citizen should be guided.

How much free speech is consistent with the safety of the nation? There is the rub, and it is to the credit of Professor Chafee that in his wise and scholarly book he meets the problem head on, and solves it, I submit, to the satisfaction of those who genuinely believe in human freedom. His solution derives from Socrates, and runs in a straight line through John Stuart Mill to Justice Holmes. What it amounts to is this: men must be free to think and to speak if they are to discover the truth. The need is even greater in war than in

peace, for in war the truth is harder to discover. Free speech is important to the man who speaks it, but it is infinitely more important to the nation which hears it. Thus the nation has a social interest in free speech. Professor Chafee writes: "... the great interest in free speech should be sacrificed only when the interest in public safety is really imperiled, and not, as most men believe, when it is barely conceivable that it may be slightly affected." As Justice Holmes put it for the Supreme Court in *Schenck* v. *United States*, there must be "a clear and present danger."

This policy was not followed in 1917. Speech was judged too often by the test of "bad tendency," which is bad law and worse politics. This policy had three unfortunate results. First, it caused much personal hardship. Second, it kept many discreet people from speaking out when their criticism was really needed. And third, it failed even to suppress opinion that was regarded as dangerous by the government. Witness the case of Rose Pastor Stokes. The mere publication in the Kansas City *Star* of Mrs. Stokes's statement, "I am for the people, and the government is for the profiteers," was considered so dangerous that she was sentenced to ten years in prison. But note that publication was at first limited to one newspaper in the Middle West. As soon as Mrs. Stokes was placed on trial, however, the statement was repeated by every important newspaper in the country.

The fault lay not so much in the law itself as in the way it was applied. This is one of Professor Chafee's main points. A law will be drawn, let us say, to restrain certain kinds of opinion or speech that may with some reason be considered dangerous, especially in time of war. But it is certain that such a law will in the end be broadened by improper application into a dragnet against all kinds of unpopular persons who hold unpopular opinions. Neither the jury system nor the lower judiciary is any protection, for the people and the judges share the common hysteria. Even the Supreme Court is not much protection, for it will not hear the first appeals for two or three years.

This was the experience after 1917. Extreme sentences were often reduced by executive action, some convictions were set aside by the courts, and the Supreme Court, in a long series of notable decisions over almost two decades, began to define the protection that free speech should have under the First Amendment, and even brought free speech under the wings of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the intolerance of the war period had left its spiritual and social scars. The state legislatures began to hammer out restrictive laws. Then, with the passage of the Alien Registration Act in 1940, America got a peace-time sedition law that affected citizens as well as aliens. What had happened was that intolerance of aliens had risen so high that almost any bill could be enacted if it affected to deal with aliens. During the debates Representative T. F. Ford of California said: "The mood of the House is such that if you brought in the Ten Commandments today and asked for their repeal, and attached to that request an alien law, you could get it." This intolerant attitude toward aliens is extended in large measure to all unpopular people and unpopular causes. Is there less interest in free speech? Professor Chafee thinks so. One reason, he suggests, is that newspapers have become such large business affairs that it is considered quixotic to insist on free speech. On the more favorable side Professor Chafee sees three factors which he thinks may enable us to surmount this crisis more wisely than the last. First, the mistakes of 1917-20 serve to warn us against repeating them. Second, we have in Europe a terrible warning against the evils of intolerance. Third, the scope and limits of the phrase "freedom of speech" in the First Amendment are now much more clearly defined than they were in 1917. I fear that Professor Chafee is a bit too optimistic. But whatever the outcome, we must now meet the new test. It is probably the most important test of our time, for only a people who know how to preserve freedom deserve to be free. CHARLES CURTIS MUNZ

Poe as Symbol

EDGAR ALLAN POE: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Arthur Hobson Quinn. D. Appleton–Century Company. $5.

THE spectacle of the biographer pursuing the ghost of the great poet with a butterfly net in one hand and in the other a dozen documents proving that the poet never died, or that he lived wrongly, is a spectacle I shall always applaud because it proves one tremendously important thing. This is that poets are not butterflies. For in what museum can one find the natural character of any great poet transfixed by the biographical pin? All that the biographer ever captures is a fleck of wing or a couple of antennae. All biographies remind me of the sad exhibit in the Library at Oxford, where they have preserved Shelley's watch and the copies of Sophocles and Keats that were taken from his corpse. Thus the conscientious biographer, retracing the tracks of the dead poet, picks up what oddments he can and puts them under glass: the more mementos the better.

This is especially so in the immense study of Poe issued by Dr. Quinn: I can only compare his scrupulous accumulation of documentary evidence that Poe really existed to the kleptomania of the magpie, for at least a third of the documents adduced here are elaborately irrelevant to the subject of the study. I cannot think that it was necessary to reprint verbatim the letter from Major General E. S. Adams of the War Department stating that no record could be found "of any financial arrangement which was made for a substitute for Edgar A. Perry," or to obfuscate the first chapters with obscure details about plays in which Poe's parents acted, or to print half-page inventories of the young Poe's expenses at his school in England. But in this immoderation of documents the Griswold forgeries, here given completely for the first time, go to exonerate the unnecessary excess. These forgeries demonstrate that Griswold was a worse rat than he proposed to make out Poe; that Poe should have been reduced to trafficking with such literary high-jackers as Griswold does not so much condemn Poe as it condemns the state of society that made such a collusion expedient. If this biography serves no other purpose, it should succeed in putting the vampire stick through the reputation of the disreputable Griswold. Other poets than Poe have tippled, but few have been dogged by Griswolds.

The technical judgments made by Dr. Quinn on the poems and the prose abuse themselves with the enthusiasm that

writes such sentences as: "For where in our history has a boy of twenty-two shown such a mastery of nearly every form of temporal, accentual, and tonal variety the English language affords?" The answer is in Milton, Pope, Tennyson, Chatterton, Wordsworth, and so on. The reputation of Poe as poet rests largely on poems that it is impossible to take with what Matthew Arnold called high seriousness. "The Raven" is a notorious rather than a famous poem; "The Bells" is not a poem, it is a game; and the lyric considered by Dr. Quinn to be the finest poem of Poe's, "To Helen" ("The glory that was Greece," etc.), is really a song that Byron forgot to write. Poe as poet is acknowledgedly a Frenchman, the illegitimate son of Charles Baudelaire; but Poe the Short Story Man is no one's son and every short-story writer's father. For whereas so much of the prose of so many poets represents only poems that failed to take to the air, most of Poe's poems represent short stories that failed to keep both feet on the ground. For this reason I think "Ligeia" considerably more of a poem than say "Annabel Lee." It is not hard to see why Emerson referred to Poe as "the jingle man." But Aldous Huxley dissected Poe as formal poet far more efficiently than is called for here. For, finally, it is not so much the poems that make Poe in the highest sense the inaugurator of American literature, nor masterpieces like "The Masque of the Red Death" or "The Fall of the House of Usher"; it is the life that, shot through as luridly with alcohol as with words, made Poe into the symbol that he has remained. This is the poet militant after poems, pursuing poems when his toes show through his shoes, his wife lies dying in a slum, his self-respect has dissolved in drink, and his income consists of the generosity of friends. This is a passion of dedication that makes the existence of the individual take on proportions so great as to be impersonal; thus Poe becomes symbol. From such lives, poems sooner or later, either from the subject or his successors, necessarily come. In this sense Poe inaugurated American literature; and to the veneration of such lives even greater memorials than this biography are appropriate.

GEORGE BARKER

Legitimacy and Revolution

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: TALLEYRAND AND THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. By Guglielmo Ferrero. Translated by Theodore R. Jaeckel. G. P. Putnam's Sons. $3.50.

IN HIS recent biography of Père Joseph, Aldous Huxley tells us that politics mean crime and madness and that even the most benevolent politician cannot do anything good. Guglielmo Ferrero, less radical but perhaps more friendly toward humanity, sticks to the difference between good politicians and bad politicians. To confront us with an example of constructive statecraft he chose the policy that put an end to the Napoleonic adventure, the policy of Talleyrand.

Mr. Ferrero lives in the past with the same intensity as in the present. He approaches with a fresh astonishment a part of history which has been reviewed very often as if it had never been told before and as if the things he tells of could after all have happened quite differently. There is no way of judging our own era except by comparison. There is no way to understand and vivify the past except in the light of our own experiences. To be sure, Mr. Ferrero does not ignore the abyss between the age of Talleyrand and ours, but he is also aware of a mechanism of politics and forces, we might even say a mechanism of the human soul, which remains the same through the ages.

His thesis is the following: There are two essentially different forms of government, the legitimate and the revolutionary. The former must not be confounded with hereditary monarchy, although in the days of Talleyrand the old dynasties were still the chief examples of legitimate government; they had ruled for many centuries and the majority of the governed believed in their right to govern. "Legitimacy," then, means the consistency of governmental action with its own principle; and the consent of the governed, the rational consent of democracy as well as the irrational consent of tradition. Such a government is the guaranty of peace and continuity. The usurper's government, unprotected by tradition, unrestricted by self-imposed discipline, unassured of the consent of the governed, cannot keep peace; once embarked on the course of adventures, it cannot regain peace because peace's first requisites—legitimacy, mutual confidence, religion—are lacking. This is why the peace treaties concluded with Napoleon were only armistices and why the pact concluded with the Bourbons lasted for a century.

Mr. Ferrero anticipates most of the objections one might be tempted to make. Legitimacy must be living, progressive, not dead, as was the Bourbon regime of 1789 or the Third Republic during its last years. "Revolution," on the other hand, is not identical with usurpation and adventure under all circumstances.

> Revolution is a word with a double meaning, which for a century and a half has concealed one of the most tragic ambiguities in which men can lose themselves. By "revolution" we mean sometimes a reorientation of the human mind, an avenue leading to the future. . . . But we also mean by "revolution" the crumbling or the overthrow of an ancient order, the total or partial subversion of established laws. . . . The French Revolution was the greatest example of an equivocal revolution from start to finish, because it was dual right from its origin. . . . Two separate revolutions, one creative, the other destructive, took place simultaneously, and the chaos caused by the latter agitated, sidetracked, paralyzed, and finally annihilated the creative forces. . . . More and more, during the great peace of the nineteenth century, the Western mind came to confuse the two meanings of the word, and ended up by convincing itself that every subversion of law and order, every destruction of an existing legitimacy, is, and must of necessity be, the beginning of a new and better orientation for humanity. The fallacy of this confusion is now apparent.

The book, although it tells a story, assumes the character of an essay, since the historical facts are arranged around a single leading idea. Ferrero omits nothing that can be said in favor of the Bourbon restoration and the Congress of Vienna. But recent experiences have made the old liberal a little partial to the conservatives of 1814. He dramatizes the great but limited influence of Talleyrand; he somewhat idealizes this greedy sage and, much more so, the restored king, "Louis l'Inévitable." The horrible episode of the Hun-

dred Days—incidentally a decisive blow to Talleyrand's European prestige—is not sufficiently exposed in its causes and frustrating consequences. Nor is the clash between the different social tendencies, whose paradoxical alliance had overwhelmed Napoleon, seen with all its implications for the future. No great political task has an ideal solution. The restoration of 1814, although at the moment probably the best possible thing, was far from being an ideal solution; not even in France, much less in Spain, in Naples, or the Church State.

The only weakness in the mild and gerontocratic wisdom of the old historian is that there is something too mechanical in it. To his mind, the good politician exercises the function of a dike warden. But wherefrom come the forces which threaten the dike? He calls Napoleon's desire for power a "childish myth"; he considers *fear* the real motive for his conquests. But it was not the Austrian and Russian appeasers of whom Napoleon had to be afraid during the fateful years 1801 to 1805, or who forced him to play the Charlemagne. Nor had the Germans any reason to fear the European democracies in 1938. Fear, as the reason for disastrous adventure, is a little overrated by Ferrero. Lust for power, though every schoolboy knows what it means, is not a childish myth. The consciousness of immense military superiority, of strength, played its part too. Again, where does this strength come from? It causes the dike break; the dike break cannot explain it. A purely political mechanism cannot stifle it. Today, Mr. Ferrero holds, a legitimate government—a government with which a good peace can be made—has to be a representative one, one which grants the right of free vote and opposition. But if a German Talleyrand should establish a government on such a basis tomorrow—what would come out of it?

GOLO MANN

From Hippocrates to Freud

A HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Gregory Zilboorg in Collaboration with George W. Henry. W. W. Norton and Company. $5.

TO ATTEMPT to write the first history of medical psychology in any language was a tremendous undertaking. Dr. Zilboorg's task—and his it is, for Dr. Henry's two appended chapters comprise less than a sixth of the book—was made still more difficult by his own broad concept of his problem. It is his belief that a physician, especially one who deals with that phase of human life generally called "mental," is peculiarly a product of his own cultural era; that his attitude toward his patients must reflect the prevailing attitude toward the importance of the individual. From Hippocrates, who by questioning the sacredness of epilepsy made the objective study of mental disease possible, to Galen, medical psychology, in spite of some pretty strange ideas, went forward. When Eastern mysticism and Northern barbarism closed in on man and robbed him of his dignity, the interest in mental disease was "torn away from medicine" and delivered to the church. Men and women who differed conspicuously from their brothers and sisters were no longer considered ill but bewitched and were terribly tortured for their own good. With the Renaissance the attitude toward insanity became gradually more intelligent and tolerant until that dramatic day arrived during the French Revolution when Philippe Pinel took the chains and fetters from the inmates of the Bicêtre, France's equivalent of Bedlam. Up to this point Dr. Zilboorg's literary facility and his broad historical perspective make his story absorbing and convincing. From then until he reaches Sigmund Freud, whom he sees both as "the first humanist in clinical psychology" and "the last representative of the Renaissance," there is a marked change in Dr. Zilboorg's attitude toward his subject. He resorts to petty criticism of the men whose work he must describe and to the psychoanalytical dodge of probing their unrecorded emotions.

The reason for this peculiar change is to be found in a letter which Pinel wrote and Dr. Zilboorg quotes. Pinel made fun of Anton Mesmer. So did Benjamin Franklin and the commission made up of the most brilliant scientists and physicians in France whom Louis XVI appointed to investigate animal magnetism. Dr. Zilboorg, however, cannot accept this laughter as the reasonable and inevitable reaction of the most enlightened group of men ever assembled in a single tribunal to consider the preposterous theory of a mountebank, because therapeutic method has developed without a break from Mesmer through Charcot and the hypnotists of Nancy to Sigmund Freud, and there is a striking similarity between the mental catharsis of psychoanalysis and the physical crisis of the mesmerist process. Thus the school of psychiatry to which Dr. Zilboorg belongs, and which he believes to be the only possible "scientific" one, forces him to defend and rationalize mesmerism and, as a corollary, to impute an emotional rejection of the heliocentric theory and a strong unconscious belief in devils and demons to Franklin, Lavoisier, Bailly, the members of the Academy of Science and the Faculty of Medicine of France, the Royal Medical Society of London, and every scientist, physician, and layman who since 1784 has accepted the rationalistic, scientific tradition set forth in the commission's Report on Animal Magnetism. This position leads Dr. Zilboorg finally to the astonishing statement that while Krafft-Ebing's discovery of the relationship of general paralysis to syphilis was a great benefit to hundreds of thousands of miserable sufferers, it proved a "step backward" for psychopathology.

The story of medical psychology from a purely psychoanalytic point of view is probably told here as fairly, certainly as intelligently, as it could be. The trouble is that there are still in the world today, at least here and in England, a great many distinguished scientists who are just as "kindly" and "humane" as Sigmund Freud and Gregory Zilboorg but who refuse to accept psychoanalytical fantasies as ultimate realities of science. These men, working patiently in laboratories, hospitals, and clinics, are still motivated by what Dr. Zilboorg considers the absurd and somehow immoral hope of some day finding the physical cause, and thereby the real cure, of mental diseases. It is doubtful whether Dr. Henry's two scant chapters on organic mental diseases and their institutional care will reconcile them to finding themselves classed by Dr. Zilboorg with devil worshipers and witch-burners.

GRACE ADAMS

Modern Warfare—an Analysis

THE NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE. By Cyril Falls. Oxford University Press. $1.25.

CAPTAIN FALLS'S brilliant analysis of the deeper military aspects of the present conflict is a reviewer's dream. It is not merely by far the most penetrating study produced by this war; it is also a work of art, perfect in balance and execution, and crammed full of keen observations and profound insights.

As military correspondent to the London *Times* Captain Falls commands a wealth of information vouchsafed to few if any observers outside the ring of the main actors themselves. His long collaboration in the official British "History of the World War" has endowed him with an extraordinarily broad historical background, which reveals its influence in the quiet, sober common sense, averse to all extremes and preconceived ideas, that permeates every page. But what raises his book above the level of an interesting topical study to that of a permanent achievement is his insight into the deeper problems of the nature and conduct of war. This insight he owes to that master of military thought, Clausewitz, who, as the author puts it, "is the only great mind that I know of which has ever made a study of warfare wherein profound philosophical conceptions are allied with wide practical experience"; the same judgment, if we substitute historical knowledge for practical experience, might be applied to Captain Falls.

His study begins, naturally enough, with an examination of the "doctrine of total war." Total war is defined by him in the first instance as a form of war directed against the sum total of the enemy's existence, secondarily as the mobilization of the sum total of our own energies and resources. In the strategic sphere he finds it characterized by the generation of a remarkable dynamic energy, by the systematic use of propaganda, by a freedom of action engendered by the absence of any moral inhibitions whatsoever, and by the production of strategic conceptions of a "grandiose kind, marked by a certain genius." Other tactical and strategic characteristics of total war are the subversive activities commonly grouped together as "fifth column"—in its original connotation, as Captain Falls reminds us, a perfectly honorable conception—and the tactics of parachute troops.

Captain Falls makes a sharp distinction between total warfare, of mass armies backed by mass labor, and the mechanized attack so frequently fused with it into a vague, composite picture labeled *Blitzkrieg*. In fact, as he rightly emphasizes, this idea of "mechanized attack" was originally taken up by men like von Seeckt, Fuller, De Gaulle for the purpose of doing away with the inartistic mass slaughter of the World War, "with its slender gains of ground, its self-made mud; and also with its denial of the chance of subtlety in strategy or tactics, its straightforward slogging without maneuver, its leveling down." The decisive factor of the mechanized attack Captain Falls sees to be not merely the tank breakthrough but the putting out of action of the enemy's artillery on a frontage of at least several miles, an accomplishment which the tank alone would be unable to achieve and which the Germans in their campaign in the Low Countries owed probably more to their low-flying aircraft than to dive bombers.

Despite the superiority thus temporarily gained by the attack Captain Falls believes the dictum of Clausewitz that defense is the stronger form of war to be as true as ever if taken as a generalization applied over a long period. The elements of this superior strength are, under present-day conditions, depth in defense, perfected concealment, and the refusal to present to the enemy a rigid front to be broken.

In the fifth and final chapter on immutable realities Captain Falls, having first dealt with that most perplexing of distinctions, between strategy and tactics, touches upon those characteristics of warfare which in his opinion constitute permanent factors governing strategy throughout the ages. These, to which he wisely refrains from applying the equivocal term of principles, he finds in "the moral sphere, the ideal of the undeviating thrust, the element of gambling, the element of friction, the fog of war, the diminishing force of the offensive, the need to fight for information, the need for protection, the ideal of economy of force, the element of surprise." A few brief but excellent observations on sea and air strategy, in which we note with interest his disapproval of the brilliant but untenable views recently put forward by Captain Russell Grenfell in "T 124" conclude the book.

HERBERT ROSINSKI

"He Will Not Care. But Here We Are"

HANNA, CRANE, AND THE MAUVE DECADE. By Thomas Beer. Alfred A. Knopf. $3.75.

TO reread Thomas Beer's three brilliant books of history and biography—"The Mauve Decade," "Stephen Crane," and "Hanna"—now republished in an omnibus volume, is to experience not so much one's original enchanted astonishment at the virtuosity of the author as awe at the learning, the endless curiosity and patience, the extraordinary memory that were necessary to conjure up the so recent, yet so remote past. Delight one experiences, too, of course—the highest degree of intellectual pleasure—at the range and quality of Beer's wit, the gusto with which he employed his erudition, the bland ease with which, by means of startling juxtapositions, he ignored or broke through all barriers of time and space.

Aware of but never hampered by tradition, he frequently either ignored cause and effect for the sake of dramatic emphasis or traced them so elliptically that a reader is forced, with a sharp sense of frustration, to glance back several times to find out, for instance, how the Dalton boys in Coffeyville, Kansas, happened to serve as Tennyson's escort to Valhalla. One carries away in one's mind, after due concentration, the picture of a Wagnerian funeral procession with the Kansas bad men chanting, "Into the jaws of death rode the six hundred." The image is clearly an excellent symbol of the curious contradictions, the illogical patterns, in American life at the turn of the century. Such was Tom Beer's method, his magic. To the reading public he paid the compliment of demanding its sharpest intelligence

Beer's avowed lack of interest in the ethical significance of his subject—some might label it decadence, others the essential principle of honest biographical writing—is only one of the characteristics marking his kinship, not with any other American writer, but with the Englishman, also dead at fifty, who by his erudition, wit, fastidious taste, and gift for terse, ironic expression illuminated the Victorian Age in England with the same vividness and distinction that Beer brought to his re-creations of American life at the turn of the century and earlier. The resemblance between Thomas Beer and Lytton Strachey is curiously striking. Both were intellectual aristocrats, to whom the problem of aesthetics as expressed in all the arts was of great importance; both were ruthless in their demands on themselves and their readers, offering no quarter in their use of irony, ellipsis, the recondite reference. Strachey, however, compensated for his lack of warmth and enthusiasm by an exquisite clarity and simplicity of style, while Beer's gusto, his heightened awareness on every level, drove him to occasionally maddening extravagances of expression.

In their choice of heroines, too, the similarity of Beer's and Strachey's taste holds. "The Titaness" ruled the Mauve Decade, and nowhere, except perhaps in his delineation of Mrs. Egg, the subject of his adept and amusing short stories, has Beer so brilliantly displayed his capacity for understanding and projecting the matriarch, whether thwarted or fulfilled. Elizabeth, Victoria, Florence Nightingale, Lady Hester Stanhope, and Madame du Deffand measure the range of Mr. Strachey's Titanesses.

In his biographical introduction to the posthumously published volume of George Bellows's lithographs, Tom Beer wrote:

> A man had turned with courage and audacity on the American scene. . . . He had projected into the tameness of native art a flare of pugnacity and had demanded freedom of subject for the native painters. . . . But art is an illusion of man who believes that he can conquer both himself and time, and time is the final judge of the illusion's merit.

Tom Beer died just as he was beginning to conquer himself. But as long as the art of biography flourishes in American life, his conquest of time is no illusion.

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A capable novel about a middle-aged officer of the English merchant marine who retires from the sea to a little farm in Connecticut, only to find there the romance that has passed him by for thirty years on the sea lanes. Mr. McFee walks the New England soil with a sure and steady tread, though this is the first time he has ever placed his characters out of the reach of ocean spray.

JOURNEY FOR MARGARET. By W. L. White. Harcourt, Brace and Company. $2.50.

Margaret is a three-and-a-half-year-old English child whom Mr. White, the well-known correspondent and son of the famous Kansas editor, brought home to adopt. It is her story—her sojourn in Anna Freud's Rest Home for bomb orphans and her trip to America—which interlards Mr. White's story of Britain at war and gives it its distinctive human interest.

ANTHONY WAYNE. Trouble Shooter of the American Revolution. By Harry Emerson Wildes. Harcourt, Brace and Company. $3.75.

On the basis of much new material, including thousands of previously inaccessible letters in the possession of the Wayne family, a new picture of "Mad Anthony" is presented. He is shown as an extremely able and daring general, who played a key part in the Northern campaign, in the Carolinas and Georgia, at Yorktown, and years later in the Northwest Territory. He was also a useful politician both in Pennsylvania and in Georgia, and, we are told, a fascinating social figure. We must take this on faith; for like many writers with important material, Mr. Wildes is not sufficiently interested in biography as an art. Occasional overwritten passages and imaginary conversations will not lighten this stolid book for the general reader and will have to be skimmed over by serious students, for whom, nevertheless, the volume will be a necessary one.

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN DEFENSE. By Seymour E. Harris. W. W. Norton and Company. $3.50.

A Harvard economics professor here tries to give an over-all view of the national defense program, implying that the inevitable departmentalization of modern government prevents administrators from seeing the picture whole. Yet although Dr. Harris covers a wide and interesting field, from the pre-war background of our defense effort to post-war problems, he has not succeeded in actually finding out what has been going on. As a result, his treatment is discursive, while the central issues of increased production and integrated planning are scarcely touched upon. The real story of the economics of American defense will be written after the war is over by economists who stood near the center of the Washington vortex.

RECORDS

TWO new recorded performances of the Franck Symphony are available which are excellent in their different styles, and which are, in their equally different ways, excellently reproduced. Monteux's with the San Francisco Symphony (Victor Set 840, $5.50) is the rhetorically expansive performance, but one that stays within the limits of good musical taste; my own preference is for the simplicity and directness of Beecham's performance with the London Philharmonic (Columbia Set 479, $5.50), which reduce the expansive rhetoric that I dislike in the music, and for the qualities in the performance that express his clear and sharp musical intelligence. Monteux's performance has the expansively gorgeous sound of American Victor recording—and the new Monteux recordings are the finest examples of the type that have come from Victor recently; my own preference again is for the clean-cut refinement of sound of the English recording of the Beecham performance. My copy of each has a number of noisily defective surfaces.

In addition to the gorgeous sound that is American Victor's best there is this month the harder, somewhat brash sound that is to be heard in the set (838, $4.50) of Mozart's Sinfonia Concertante K. 364, my copy of which also has one noisily defective surface. Stiedry produces a superb performance with the excellent little New Friends of Music Orchestra and with Spalding and Primrose as the violin and viola soloists—the first playing less impressively than the second.

And then Victor offers the shockingly bad sound—harsh, thin, with no body, depth, or warmth, and noisily clouded by reverberation—of the recording of Toscanini's performance of the Tchaikovsky Piano Concerto No. 1 with the N. B. C. Symphony and Horowitz (Set 800, $4.50). I put it this way because it *is* Toscanini's performance—breath-taking in intensity, pace—to which Horowitz contributes brilliant playing of the solo part. In Carnegie Hall it was a performance to end all performances of the work; on these records its altered sound gives it a hectic quality at times, and may cause one to prefer one of the older versions.

On the other hand Victor gives us an extraordinarily fine example of the English type of recording in the set (837, $3.50) of Schumann's Symphony No. 4 made by Bruno Walter with the London Symphony. Schumann's symphonies are not his best works; but this one is the best of the lot, with some beautiful pages—the introduction to the first movement, the second and third movements in which this introduction recurs. They call for just the emotional softness and warmth that Walter brings to music; the performance, then, is perfect; and even the surfaces are only slightly blemished.

Mozart's fine Piano Sonata K. 576, which Casadesus plays in the polished, anemic French Mozart style on Columbia, is played by Arrau with admirable structural clarity, strength, and warmth in a new Victor set (842, $3.50), together with the engaging lesser Sonata K. 283. And Beethoven's Sonata Op. 5 No. 1 for 'cello and piano, which I do not find interesting, is superbly performed by Casals and Horszowski (Set 843, $3.50).

Columbia offers Bruno Walter's fine performance of Smetana's beautiful "Moldau" with the New York Philharmonic-Symphony (Set X-211, $2.50), of which the recorded sound is good but not clean. The same may be said of the sound of Rodzinski's tensely overemphatic performance of Strauss's "Till Eulenspiegel" with the Cleveland Orchestra (Set X-210, $2.50), to which I prefer the more relaxed and genial Fritz Busch performance on Victor.

The programs of the New Friends of Music Orchestra series contain a few items of lesser Mozart that I find unpromising, but also very fine things, including Bach's Art of Fugue again, Mozart's wonderful Piano Concerto K. 453, to be played this time by Schnabel, and his delightful Violin Concerto K. 216, to be played by Szigeti. Perhaps Victor and Columbia can be persuaded to record the performances of the concertos.

B. H. HAGGIN

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THE *Nation*
55 Fifth Ave. New York

Letters to the Editors

Mr. Schlesinger's Analogies

Dear Sirs: Wars are fought and forgotten and policies go into the limbo of historical relics—all except the War Between the States and the institution of slavery.

I am moved to these reflections by the article Can Willkie Save His Party? by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in *The Nation* of December 6. The author's first two paragraphs are excellent, but it is a pity he did not stop with the words "He is confronted by a trying and difficult problem." For Mr. Schlesinger was confronted with just that sort of problem—how to make the Southern party analogous to big business and Nazi predilections, and the Northern party analogous to simple democracy and liberalism. His reasoning runs like this: Both major parties of the nineteenth century, the Democratic and the Whig, were American because they were both Northern; the "enemy" was the South; the Nazism of the day was chattel slavery. Finally, all the "liberal" forces coalesced in the Republican Party and defeated the Southern Nazis.

What a travesty of history is this! The Southern slaveholders hated big business more intensely than Mr. Schlesinger does. Despite slavery, they were the most liberal politicians of the day. Certainly the Nazis today would repudiate chattel slavery, but they would not hesitate to maintain—they seek—industrial slavery. This makes Republicanism and Nazism analogous. If Mr. Schlesinger seeks further proof, let him compare the treatment of conquered countries by the Nazis with that of the South by the Republican Party.

But Mr. Schlesinger, occupied with "moral" principles, has apparently never heard of a thieving tariff gang, or of that fanatical and materialist nationalism which is determined to sweep all diverse elements into a common stream. He finds Mr. Willkie truly admirable—without bothering to ascertain why *any* liberal would associate himself with a predatory party. Seward he almost canonizes—Seward, who remarked to the British minister when habeas corpus was suspended: "I can press this button and have a man—any man—in Cleveland or New York—anywhere—hanged without a trial. Has the Queen any greater power?" The British ambassador's enlightened reply was: "I do not think her Majesty would want such power." ARTHUR SIYRON

Roxbury, Conn., December 17

We Take a Bow

Dear Sirs: A bouquet to *The Nation* for its willingness to be fair to Willkie, as shown by its editorial comment on his connection with the Schneiderman case and its publication of the article Can Willkie Save the Republican Party?

ALICE DYAR RUSSELL

South Pasadena, Cal., December 11

Willkie and J. Q. Adams

Dear Sirs: I read with keen interest Mr. Schlesinger's very penetrating analysis of the Republican Party and his most pertinent comparison of its situation today with that of the Whigs in the 1850's. I should like to suggest that the coming of war to the United States gives point to still another historical parallel.

The Federalist Party, grandfather of the Republican Party, ran its last race in 1816. Drawing its support largely from the business interests, it had refused to adapt its policies to new issues and changing economic conditions. It had also refused to support the country in the War of 1812. John Quincy Adams, who may be compared to Wendell Willkie in this connection, had voted for the Louisiana Purchase and the Embargo Act. This support of Jeffersonian foreign policy had caused him to be repudiated by the Federalists in 1808 with a bitterness analogous to that displayed by many Republicans toward Mr. Willkie today.

The most ridiculous spectacle of the past week has been that of isolationists shouting that the Administration has been caught unprepared by an attack which for two years they have contended could not possibly be made. They have small right to criticize until they have admitted that events have proved their views to have been mistaken, but there is little evidence of this attitude being adopted. This points to a continuance of the parallel with the Federalist suicide.

On the other hand, the vote in Congress and the support most Republicans are giving to the government regardless of party gives promise of a larger view. It is to be hoped that a patriotic unanimity of sentiment may be achieved, and that in this the Republican Party will find continued life.

HARVEY L. CARTER

Collegeville, Pa., December 17

On Winning the Peace

Dear Sirs: We shall win the war. We are Americans, and our cause is just. We shall show those "dirty little Japs." At last Hitler has met his match. He can never conquer America. We shall rid the world of the Nazi menace; we shall free the enslaved of Europe, Asia, and Africa. All men have a right to be free—not equal, perhaps, but free. Of all countries we are the freest, the bravest, the greatest, the best. Our allies will do as we ask. In the words of the radio commentator, "Russia will declare war on Japan when we wish it, for Washington holds Russia in the palm of its hand."

Yes, we shall win the war, but if by these tokens we win it, we shall not win the peace that follows, despite Mr. Roosevelt's firm words. The peace will be harder than the war for America to win. Only a nation with the soul of a Lincoln can win both a victory and a peace. ELSIE A. JOHNSON

St. Louis, Mo., December 18

Credit Transferred

Dear Sirs: A recent item in *The Nation* credited the Southern Workers' Defense League with sole responsibility for securing a federal investigation into the flogging of two C. I. O. organizers near Harriman, Tennessee. This is a misconception which we wish to see cleared up with fairness to all parties concerned.

The Southern Workers' Defense League was only one of a number of unions and progressive organizations working to secure this investigation. As a matter of fact, chief credit for finally getting the inquiry should go to Paul Christopher, Tennessee C. I. O. director, and Washington C. I. O. officials.

FRANK MC CALLISTER, Secretary

Atlanta, Ga., December 17

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